SUNDAY EDITORIAL | But many members of the clan-based factions within the ICU have a different interpretation of jihad .

Somalia's politics is very fluid, as observers are quick to note. That idea equally applies to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) – an Islamist militia that arose to fame in 2006 after triumphing over Mogadishu's notorious warlords. For the past 21 months, Islamist guerrillas have led a bloody campaign against Ethiopian troops protecting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu. Thousands of civilians have been killed and hundreds of thousands more displaced by the conflict, creating what is arguable Africa's worst humanitarian crisis.

The death and destruction was justified under the pretense of fighting against Ethiopian "occupation troops" and their Somali collaborators, led by TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf. As the violence worsened, however, cracks began to appear among Islamist factions waging war on Yusuf's interim government. By June 2008, the ICU's executive chairman inked a peace agreement (the "Djibouti Agreement") with the TFG. The dramatic move firmly established a part of the armed opposition on the path to a formal ceasefire, helped revive the reconciliation process and open dialogue regarding the orderly withdrawal of the Ethiopian army from Somali soil.

This development angered some opposition groups, who vowed to continue the guerrilla war – or, the jihad as they like to claim. The armed groups who rejected the Djibouti Agreement – most notably, al Shabaab – have publicly distanced themselves from the ICU core. For example, the al Shabaab insurgents' mortar attacks on Mogadishu's international airport has been opposed by the ICU's most prominent personalities, including Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, on grounds that the airport provides vital services to the public.

For al Shabaab, the airport attacks is a matter of proving to the ICU leaders – as well as the international community – that the Djibouti Agreement cannot be implemented on the ground in Somalia. It is a commitment that the group – labeled as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government last spring – has effectively broken off from the ICU. Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, an American professor who is an insightful analyst of Somali affairs, recently wrote regarding the ICU/al Shabaab split: " This clash of perspectives reveals a fault line in the armed opposition that runs much deeper than divergence in tactics and is only imperfectly designated by abstract terms such as 'extremism' and 'moderation'."

Certainly, the Djibouti Agreement has already changed reality on the ground. For one, clan-based factions within the ICU have largely welcomed the peace process and a possible power-sharing deal with the TFG. Secondly, these same clan-based factions have signed on to a program that would see "extremist" groups, i.e. al Shabaab, pushed out of districts and regions inhabited by pro-insurgency clans in central and southern Somalia. And thirdly, as insiders have revealed, the public feud among insurgents has already spilled over onto the streets with widespread speculation that the fighting ranks have been broken up.

The strategy is to isolate al Shabaab and like-minded groups, while co-opting reasonable elements of the armed opposition. Islamists currently control three provincial capitals – Beletwein (Hiran Region), Jowhar (Middle Shabelle Region) and Kismayo (Lower Jubba Region). In Beletwein and Jowhar, where the ICU's clan-based faction is most prominent, local administrators have been appointed from among the respective regions' native clans. Conversely, the strategic port city of Kismayo is controlled by al Shabaab, who appointed a non-local mayor based on religious merits with utter disregard for the Somali clan system.

Al Shabaab is a group that is not inhibited by the clan structure and, therefore, supports the continuation of the anti-Ethiopia jihad declared by ICU leaders – whatever the cost. But many members of the clan-based factions within the ICU have a different interpretation of jihad; for example, in 1991 when Somalia's last ruler Gen. Siad Barre was overthrown, Hawiye clan warlords declared jihad against Barre's Darod clan, killing tens of thousands of civilians and displacing nearly all of Mogadishu's population. It is an open secret that many men who engaged in the anti-Darod jihad of the early 1990s – with massacres in Mogadishu, Galkayo and Kismayo – are now prominent figures in the Hawiye-dominated ICU.

TFG President Yusuf has long maintained that armed opposition groups are not fighting a religious war; rather, the ICU and other opposition groups are hell-bent on attaining power and controlling Somalia's destiny. The only difference is the approach – through violent force or political accommodation. For the ICU's clan-based factions, accommodation is an attractive offer that falls well within the boundaries of Somalia's fluid politics.

Garowe Online Editorial, editorial@garoweonline.com