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After a Charade Somalia's Opposition Ruptures
24 Jul 24, 2008 - 11:06:34 AM
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Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
n July 22, the faction of Somalia's ruptured opposition - the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.) - that is based in Eritrea's capital Asmara announced that its central committee had removed the A.R.S.'s executive chair, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, and its central committee chair, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, from office and had named Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sharif Salah Muhammad Ali to those positions, respectively. The action of A.R.S.-A finalized a split in the alliance between its elements that favored negotiations with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) in order to end Ethiopia's occupation of the country and those that eschewed negotiations in favor of a strategy of armed liberation to drive out the Ethiopians.
The dispute over liberation strategy in the A.R.S. can be traced back to before the alliance was formed in fall 2007 to the period prior to December 2006, when Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia that ousted the Islamic Courts Union (I.C.U.), which dominates the A.R.S., from control over most of the southern and central regions of the country. During its time of ascendancy in Somalia from spring to winter 2006, the I.C.U. pursued a dual-track policy of negotiations with the internationally recognized but ineffectual T.F.G., and armed revolution aimed at transforming Somalia into a state based on Shari'a law. As Ethiopia moved to protect the embattled T.F.G. by sending in military forces, and plans to deploy an African Union peacekeeping force into Somalia that would prop up the T.F.G. and was backed by Western powers gained momentum, the I.C.U.'s diplomatic track was blocked and its military wing gained ascendancy, eventually leading to declarations of jihad against Ethiopia, military actions threatening the T.F.G.'s provisional capital Baidoa, and, finally, the Ethiopian invasion, which was supported by the United States and decimated the I.C.U.
Immediately after the invasion, an armed insurgency against the occupiers began
that included Courts fighters, militias from clans that felt marginalized by the T.F.G. and nationalists. As time went on, the insurgency gained strength and the opposition had regrouped sufficiently to form the A.R.S., which was based on a coalition of the Courts, dissident parliamentarians who had defected from the T.F.G., some ex-warlords, and activists from the Somali diaspora. The A.R.S. initially followed the pattern of the early I.C.U., adopting a dual- track diplomatic-military policy. That policy stayed in place until early 2008, when the Western powers, led by the U.S., decided to abandon their strategy of isolating the A.R.S. and switched to supporting negotiations between the T.F.G. and those in the A.R.S. who were will to enter "peace talks," with the aim of
isolating the alliance's military wing and co-opting its diplomatic wing.
The Western powers were able to pressure the T.F.G. to reach out to A.R.S. "moderates" by engineering the replacement of then prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, by the more compliant Nur "Adde" Hassan Hussein, and found a willing mediator in United Nations special representative to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah. The efforts of the Western powers bore fruit in early June, when the diplomatic wing of the A.R.S. entered talks with the T.F.G. in Djibouti that eventuated in an agreement that stipulated a cease-fire and laid down an ambiguous timetable for Ethiopian withdrawal. The A.R.S.'s diplomatic wing then based itself in Djibouti and called for A.R.S.-A to join it there.
A.R.S.-A immediately rejected the Djibouti accord on the grounds that it did not guarantee Ethiopian withdrawal and vowed to continue on the path of armed liberation. A.R.S.-D's leader, Sheikh Sharif, attempted to mend fences by clarifying that A.R.S.-D would take up the military track once again if Ethiopian forces had not left Somalia within the 120 days specified in the Djibouti accord, but that did not satisfy A.R.S.-A.
Realizing that a complete rupture in the A.R.S. would deprive A.R.S.-D of legitimacy, the West, working through Yemen, attempted to bring together A.R.S.- A and A.R.S.-D in negotiations, resulting in talks in Sana'a that began on July 7.
The Sana'a Talks
From the outset, it was unlikely that the two factions would heal their rift in Sana'a. With the insurgency, composed of A.R.S. forces, the relatively independent revolutionary Islamist al-Shabaab militia and local clans associated with the two former making impressive gains on the ground, A.R.S.-A could not be expected to sign on to a cease-fire or to drop its demand for a guaranteed Ethiopian withdrawal. With A.R.S.-D's Western backers insisting that the Ethiopians remain in Somalia until they could be replaced by a multi- national stabilization force, A.R.S.-D had no space to bargain with A.R.S.-A. Given the gulf between the two factions, the Sana'a talks turned into a charade.
That A.R.S.-A was not going to Sana'a with the intent of making concessions became evident on July 5, when it opened its own central committee meeting in Asmara to discuss the "future of the A.R.S." and "correcting the mistakes made by previous leaders." A.R.S.-A's social affairs secretary, Mohamud Suldan Garyare underscored that the Sana'a talks were not a "mediation meeting": "It is a meeting with our brothers from the Courts who have given up their lives and finances, and whose support we cannot do without. It is about those who went to Djibouti to sign the agreement that we deem illegal and was meant to betray Somalis."
In his speech at the opening of the Asmara meeting, Dr. Zakaria Mohamud Abdi, A.R.S.-A's deputy chair, called the Djibouti agreement a "failed conspiracy" of the "superpowers" and opined that A.R.S.-D had "fallen into a trap" either by virtue of its members' "self-interest" or by being "intimidated" by external actors. He added that popular support for the insurgency was gaining momentum and that 95 percent of southern and central Somalia was currently under the control of A.R.S. fighters, which is an overstatement of their genuine successes. It is clear that A.R.S.-A saw Sana'a as the show of an effort it would make to persuade A.R.S.-D that the latter had gone astray.
On July 6, six representatives from A.R.S.-A led by Dr. Umar Imam Abu Bakar arrived in Sana'a where they were slated to hold talks with an A.R.S.-D delegation and would be briefed on the Djibouti agreement and Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia. A.R.S.-A's internal affairs secretary, Umar Hashi Adan, speaking to Shabelle Media Network from Asmara, said that the faction would not agree to any cease-fire applying to Ethiopian forces and would spread resistance to every corner of Somalia."
After a week of discussions that were unreported in international, regional and local media, A.R.S. spokesman Sheikh Yusuf Ali Aynte announced that an agreement between the two factions had been reached. In that accord the parties pledged to consolidate the I.C.U., resolve their differences, revise some articles in the Djibouti agreement, "raise peace efforts to an alliance level," and form a committee to implement the agreement, which, according to Sheikh Sharif, would be charged with deciding whether a multi-national stabilization mission should include only forces from Muslim states. Speaking for A.R.S.-D, Dahir Mohamud Ghelle told Garowe Online that there had been a "hot debate" over the cease-fire, Ethiopian withdrawal and the stabilization mission, concluding indecisively that "we have agreed to acknowledge the Djibouti peace accord and to await its implementation.
On July 20, A.R.S.-D's delegation had returned to Djibouti and held its own central committee meeting at which 106 members of the original A.R.S. central committee's 191 members were present as well as the French and Saudi Arabian ambassadors to Djibouti. Sheikh Sharif announced that only some of the forces in a proposed U.N. stabilization mission would come from Muslim countries, forestalling the further discussion of that issue that had been specified in the Sana'a accord.
Sheikh Aweys, the dominant figure in A.R.S.-A, although he held no official position and had no participated in the Sana'a talks, was quick to respond that A.R.S.-A would not accept any agreement to deploy foreign troops in Somalia. In an interview with al-Jazeera, Aweys went further and said that the Sana'a agreement had been "nullified" by A.R.S.-D.
Speaking for A.R.S.-A, Garyare told HornAfrik Radio that A.R.S.-D had "reneged" on the Sana'a agreement, which, according to him, had included agreement that "we shouldn't recognize the government [T.F.G.], and that the country is currently under "colonization": "We had agreed on all of those issues, but after they came back [to Djibouti], they reneged on their pledges and said they will continue with the peace talks. It seems they are saying, we will continue with our plans."
On July 22, the A.R.S.-A portion of the original A.R.S. central committee met in Asmara, with 50 members present and 30 voting by email, and removed Sheikh Sharif as A.R.S. chief executive, electing Sheikh Aweys to the post. A.R.S.-D spokesman Suleiman Olad Roble remarked to Agence France Presse: "What they have said is null and void."
On July 23, Sheikh Sharif expanded on Olad's remark, telling Radio HornAfrik that his ouster by A.R.S.-A was "illegal" according to the A.R.S. charter, because a two-thirds majority of the central committee is necessary to remove the executive chair and that only 30 members had voted to end his tenure. He expressed determination to remain in his post and said to Mareeg Online that Eritrea had drafted A.R.S.-A into its strategy of keeping Ethiopian troops in Somalia so that they could not be deployed on Eritrea's tense border with Ethiopia. In turn, former warlord Hussein Mohammad Aideed said that he had chaired the A.R.S.-A's central committee meeting at which Sheikh Sharif and
Hassan Adan were ousted, explaining that "the two Sharifs committed treason against the country" by "deviating" from the goal of expelling Ethiopia from Somalia, which was a violation of the A.R.S. charter.
During the ascendancy of the I.C.U. in 2006, Sheikh Sharif and Sheikh Aweys had
tensely shared leadership. Now their drama has come full circle and they confront each other across an organizational divide.
Beyond Sana'a
It is unlikely that either side entered the Sana'a talks in good faith. Apart from Western donor pressure on A.R.S.-D, both factions found it in their interest to make a show of attempting to heal their rift in order to placate their base of support in the Somali population, which is disheartened by ever more fragmentation. The Western powers were willing to let Sheikh Sharif take a shot at bolstering his severely compromised credibility and nursed the far- fetched hope that somehow some of A.R.S.-A could be co-opted into "reconciliation" with the T.F.G. under their requisites, thereby "isolating"
the armed insurgency and, particularly, al-Shabaab.
With the failure of Sana'a, it is, as HornAfrik correspondent, Abdullahi Kulmiye Adow, puts it, "still unclear what will happen once the two factions of the Alliance get divided right down the middle and become two separate groups equal to one another." That said, the outlines of a prognosis can be offered.
The major consequence of the rupture of the A.R.S. is likely to be a hardening of militant armed opposition from a more compact and unified A.R.S.-A that holds the cards on the ground and is likely to win greater trust from and forge closer links to al-Shabaab. In the original A.R.S., there was a bridge to diplomacy through what is now A.R.S.-D; that bridge has been broken, polarizing and intensifying opposition, and creating uncompromising positions.
A secondary consequence of the rupture is that A.R.S.-D has been co-opted by the West and can no longer be seen as an independent actor; it has joined the Western program and will have to work within a process in which it is forced to treat the T.F.G. and its clan formula of representation as legitimate. It will also lose any influence over the fate of the Ethiopian occupation; should Sheikh Sharif rebel against any failure to secure Ethiopian withdrawal, he and his faction would only have the option of returning to an A.R.S. under Aweys's control, because it would be powerless on its own.
For all its trouble, the West has acquired a paper asset that has no redemption value. Whether the West seduced A.R.S.-D, intimidated it, or both, which is what closed sources say, A.R.S.-D is compromised. The West now faces an armed liberation movement led by a man who is on Washington's list of supporters of terrorism and has a decades-long history of political-military leadership - the "Old Fox," Sheikh Aweys.
After the charade, the conflict continues and sharpens.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein,
Professor of Political Science, Purdue University
weinstem@purdue.edu
©2008
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