Features
Somalia: SSC Leadership Council and the Challenges of Political Partnership in Puntland
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Sep 3, 2010 - 1:28:21 PM

by Liban Ahmad**

READ: Somalia: The Need for Re-organization and Reform in Puntland (written by Ismail Ali Ismail)

In June 2010  Puntland president, Abdirahman M. Farole,  lashed out at Sool, Sanaag and Cayn leadership headed by Saleban Ahmed Isse (aka Xaglatoosiye) who lost to president Farole during Puntland presidential  selection of 2009.  “The  former TFG president  Abdullahi Yusuf  Ahmed told me that he would not have set up an armed opposition group if he could have foreseen the disintegration  of Somalia at the hands of opposition groups,” President Farole said.  In his speech president Farole criticised several men from Sool “who were chewing Qat in a hotel when Somaliland forces captured Las Anod [in ) October 2007].”

In  2008 president Farole, then a resident in Australia, criticised his predecessor for failing to defend Las Anod. “ Parts of Puntland are in the hands of an enemy,”  he told BBC  Somali Service. Farole inherited Las Anod legacy from the administration he succeeded. Why is he implying  the fall of Las Anod was down to people in Las Anod if, as Dr Abdisalam Salwe argued, Puntland is “ a direct response to the domineering political ambitions of Hawiye in the south and the secessionist  moves of the Isaaq in Somaliland”?

Like Somaliland, Puntland experienced power struggles when, in 2002, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the founding president, was replaced by Jama Ali Jama. The replacement of president Yusuf split Puntland into two camps: a camp that put its weight behind the new ‘president’ and another camp that supported the Abullahi Yusuf Ahmed and regarded the traditional leaders’ decision to support  Jama Ali Jama as violation of Puntland charter. People in Sool, Sanaag and Cayn were divided along those two camps. Hostilities erupted between forces loyal to the “ two presidents  of Puntland”.  The armed confrontations came to a end after traditional leaders led by Boqor Burmadow of Somaliland persuaded Mohamud Musse Hersi, then Somaliland-backed leader of the armed opposition against Puntland government, to reconcile with Abullahi Yusuf Ahmed . The reconciliation paved the way for Mohamud Musse Hersi’s to become Puntland president in January 2005. As a new president his endeavours and energy were split between serving people of Puntland and financing   the transitional federal government of Somalia. Puntland government’s commitment to supporting the TFG (2005-2008) affected the administration’s finances and its ability to pay civil servants and security forces.  
 
Why do SSC politicians and traditional leaders switch loyalty from one administration another?

There is nothing tribally unprincipled about the turn-coat politicians and traditional  leaders of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn when they join or spurn an administration. It is a struggle for power and influence that pits one group against another. Similar power struggles affected Somaliland ( 1993-1996) when the  supporters of first Somaliland president,  Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, had tried to undermine the new president, Mohamed Hagi Ibrahim Egal who was appointed a president  to succeed Somaliland’ founding president in 1993.

The impact of intra-Dhulbahante power struggle has not been severe because , until October 2004 when Puntland and Somaliland forces clashed near Adhi-caddeeye , their antagonisms revolved around supporting two opposing administrations. So farPuntland and Somaliland have restrained their supporters from Sool, Sanaag and Cayn to avoid intra-clan bloodshed .

Back in 2003 a sub-clan of the Dhulbahante joined Somaliland administration and  facilitated deployment of Somaliland troops. Las Anod was under Puntland but security was deteriorating. Although the Dhulbhahante sub-clans  supported the establishment of Puntland,  they  did not envisage what joining a pan-Harti administration would mean for coexistence of sub-clans. Will the customary laws trump or be trumped by the euphoria of  collective,  clan-based decision making?  Although Puntland leaders, particularly the former vice president, Mohamed Abdi Hashi, knew that Somaliland forces were deployed in parts of Sool  by consent , not by force, they tried to alienate   Dhulbhanate sub-clans that cooperated  with Somaliland institutions. Since there was no a  Dhulbahante consensus on Somaliland, a divisive strategy was used to force on other pro- Somaliland  sub-clans the idea of Puntland . And such a strategy meant taking sides in power struggle within the Dhulbahante sub-clans . In Puntland no attempt was made to prevent political disputes within  Dhulbahante sub-clans from developing into violence. The traditional leaders of Dhulbahante were only sought after during the Puntland presidential selection campaigns.  
 
The emergence of SSC leadership

 In October 2009 traditional and political leaders, members of the civil society from Sool, Sanaag and Cayn regions of northern Somalia met in Nairobi.  The traditional leaders who attended the conference are based in Somalia. Conference participants discussed, among other issues, the role of SSC political leaders in Puntland and Transitional Federal Government; politicians were criticised for not taking the interests of the people they represent seriously.  Parliamentary members of Puntland are appointed on the recommendation of the traditional leaders. So why the conference participants failed to reflect on the role of the traditional leaders is not known. However, the participants agreed that the traditional leaders had a role in appointing politicians at the Puntland level and sometimes at the TFG level. The role of traditional leaders should not be conflated into that of the politicians, the conference participants suggested. Will such a new role deny traditional leaders the prerogative to appoint political representatives from SSC?

The new political structure on which conference participants agreed is called Hoggaanka Badbaadada iyo Midaynta (Salvation and Unification Leadership Council). The conference organisers emphasised the new leadership structure has not cut ties with other Puntland clans but that Puntland government “failed the SSC people.” Puntland had three successive administrations. Which administration had let down the SSC people, the conference participants did mention. Puntland’s shortcomings affected nearly all constituencies in one way or another. Each Puntland administration failed to resist temptations of clanism. These failures point to a collective responsibility.

Pro-Puntland traditional leaders have been influential in making the outcome of Nairobi conference less critical of the  Puntland administration. They have succeeded in convincing politicians and traditional leaders to remain part and parcel of Puntland.   However, any links with pro-Puntland Sool politicians may draw the anger of those who think that Puntland botched running Sool. The SSC traditional leaders and politicians who were for setting up a separate SSC administration that comes neither under Somaliland nor Puntland have made concessions. In return they were successful in appointing former Puntland vice presidential candidate, Saleban Ahmed Isse, as the leader of HBM and Ali Hassan Sabarey, as the deputy leader. Although many influential politicians and traditional leaders are unhappy with the way Puntland dealt with the Las Anod occupation by Somaliland forces, they regarded calls to withdraw confidence from Puntland administration  as a betrayal. This approach is a tacit admission that Puntland failures are shared by all Puntlanders. 

Puntland administration’s response to SSC leadership has ranged from outright rejection to threats to use the administration’s forces to undermine the SSC leadership. SSC leadership claims to be the sole representative of Dhulbahante clan. Similar representation claims are made by pro-Somaliland and pro-Puntland SSC politicians who may cooperate with each other against SSC leadership and supporters.  In a Harti customary law context, Puntland president is the Paramount chief of Harti because he is appointed as president by Harti traditional leaders. . He has had the privilege to ask why SSC leader , Saleban Ahmed Isse and other traditional leaders, had set up a political structure that undercuts his administration. President Farole has not posed this and other relevant questions but sided with SSC pro- Puntland   supporters thereby putting question mark over the legitimacy of his administration if the Dhulbahante clan is divided along three groups.

Can SSC political factions be united?

To try to answer this question one has to answer another relevant question: why are the Dhulbhanate clan members politically divided? After the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 the Majerteen clan members revived Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the first armed Somali opposition group against the former military regime of Somalia,   for they  faced  major attacks from the United Somali Congress militias,  but the Somali National Movement, the second Somali armed opposition group in the north did not attack the Dhulbhanate territories  partly because of the agreement signed by the late Garad Abdiqani Garad Jama and sub-clans associated with the SNM. Unlike the USC, the SNM declared secession in May 1991. Given the early 1990s internecine civil war in southern Somalia, the secession was viewed by many as unilateral but as an alternative approach in sharp contrast with the  clan warfare that consumed southern Somalia. The revival of Somali Salvation Democratic Front was made necessary by the fact that the international community was  dealing with armed factions following  the collapse of the state. Mid 1990s, major agreement was signed in Ceerigaabo, the administrative capital of Sanaag region, by clans in Sanaag  region. Traditional leaders of Dhulbahnate sub-clans in Sanaag co-signed the agreement to consolidate the peace signed with the SNM in 1990. The late Somaliland president, Mohamed Hagi Ibrahim Egal, was no keen on forcing the idea of Somaliland on the clans on whom Somali National Movement did not depend for moral and financial support.

The establishment of Puntland in 1998 threw up challenges for Somaliland because Puntland, like Somaliland in 1991, drew up a new map and claimed chunks of land in the map Somaliland drew up in 1991.These developments increased the opportunities for Dhulbahante  politicians  to change sides when their  demands are not by a given administration. The parliamentary speaker of Somaliland in early 1990s was Ahmed Abdi Habsade, from Las Anod.  He was sacked by late Somaliland president Mohamed H. I. Egal. Habsade had a role in setting up Puntland administration and, as a an Interior Minister, actively campaigned against Somaliland and Dhulbahante sub-clans who invited Somaliland forces to Yagoori and Adhi-caddeeye, but he defected to Somaliland in  2007 after  he fell out with the former Puntland president, Mohamud Musse Hersi,.  Dhulbahante politicians find it easier to change their loyalty from one administration another because both Somaliland and   Puntland have failed to pay attention to  the intricacies  and diversity of Dhulbahante  politics . It is true that Majeerteen and the Isaaq clans had  clan-based  opposition groups with a view to topple the  former dictatorial regime of Siyad Barre but  unlike Dhulbahante clan,  both clans faced the wrath of the dictatorial  regime whose secret security forces targeted members of the two clans suspected of sympathising with armed opposition groups based in Ethiopia in 1980s. There were Dhulbahante members in SSDF and SNM but financial and moral support for the two opposition groups   were from the Majeerteen and Isaaq clans respectively.

Lessons learned from post-1991 political engagement of SSC people show that the loyalty of the Dhulbhanate to any administration depends on how non-Dhulbahante members in  any  administration (Somaliland or Puntland)  respond to and adjudicate the political disputes  of the clan’s politicians  and traditional leaders supporting the administration.  Puntland administration has   missed the opportunity to reconcile the SSC politicians and traditional leaders.

The SSC groups who signed up to Puntland project in 1998 were comprised of former Somaliland supporters; groups that were neither for nor against Somaliland,    and groups that were looking forward to a Harti-based political partnership. 

Conclusion

The absence of political parties in Puntland makes it hard for president Farole to  criticise  his predecessor for the  fall of Las Anod . To level such a criticism would mean  to alienate the former president’s supporters. His criticism of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn members of the administration he succeeded reflects two realities:

1-      The kinship- based political arrangements are unable to handle disputes triggered by power struggle and resource-sharing issues within sub-clans.

2-      When the seemingly benign nature of kinship ties clash with the public administration principles, frank discussion of political disputes gives in to crude intra-clan rivalry.

The intra-clan customary law was devised to deal with, among other issues, feuds, paying and sharing the blood money, negotiating with neighboring clans. Puntland founders did not put much thought into reconciling   the administration’s reliance on   the customary law with the need for an impartial system used for adjudicating public administration and political disputes.  In 2003 report Towards Good Governance in Puntland,  workshop participants made the following  observation: “ The gravest blunder committed constituted the fact that the managers of state organs— MPs, Ministerial and Judicial posts and recruitment of police officers and civil servants— had been selected on clan quota instead of on formal qualifications, merit and competence. This system impacted dramatically in the functioning of political, legislative and executive organs and the democratic way of governance.” Somalis have a saying: ilmo adeer is may indho buuxiyaan  ( Cousins don’t defer to each other).  It is saying that does not only help one explain the failure of Puntland as a political experiment for the Harti sub-clans, particularly for SSC constituencies but it also sheds light on the outcome of a clash between modernity and tradition in a Somali setting.