Essay by Ismail Ali Ismail**

Introduction

Much was expected from Puntland ever since it was established in 1998 following the collapse of the Somali state.  At that time people were content to find a haven of peace - an area where they could pursue their economic interests under the protection of an orderly administration. Puntland was then supposed to contrast sharply with the madness raging in and around Mogadishu and spreading progressively to the other southern regions.  But, there were high hopes also that it would compete favorably with its neighbor to the west, the so-called ‘Somaliland’, as the twin areas of good governance and economic advance.  

Unlike ‘Somaliland’, however, Puntland was established, not as a breakaway region, but as one of the constituent states of a new federal Somalia.  And, unlike ‘Somaliland’, it did not stand aloof and pretend to be unconcerned about the madness and mayhem in the South: it resolutely resolved that it should be proactive and play a leadership role in the international community’s effort to bring about a genuine national reconciliation in the interest of communal peace and the revival of the Somali state.  In so doing, it was not unmindful of the internal threats coming to it from its southern and western borders.  There were fears that the ceaseless hostilities in the south might spread to its borders, and ‘Somaliland’ was claiming its Sool and Sanaag regions and threatening to take them by force.  In consequence, defense became the priority of priorities and internal security was accorded pride of place in order to prevent sabotage and infiltrations. Those were costly priorities that claimed the full and undivided attention of the government.  Little else was in fact done.

The first president of Puntland, Col. Abdullahi Yusuf, was a professional soldier feared by his enemies and widely respected by others.  Much of the credit for building up a strong defense force for Puntland goes to him, and they were such a force that the state enjoyed peace both internally and externally throughout the entire period of his incumbency.  Puntland’s noticeable decline came shortly after the departure of Col. Abdullahi to Nairobi where, after a long campaign, he ended up becoming the President of the TFG in 2004 until he resigned in 2008.  Though Puntland was successful in enabling its first president to become the internationally recognized president of the entire country this came with a huge financial and material cost, which depleted its resources.  Both the financing of his campaign and the military contingents it sent to him, not only as his protection force but also as a major contribution to a national army, which was said to be in the formative stage, weakened Puntland beyond measure both internally and externally.  The problems multiplied both internally and externally and Col. Abdullahi’s successor, Gen.  Mahamoud Muse Hersi Boqor ( aka Addeh Muse) was unable to cope with them.  ‘Somaliland’ seized the opportunity to overrun Sool and occupy its capital, Las Anod.

Current Problems 

Owing to the lack of discipline, vision (policy planning) and a proper system of administration the problems of Puntland have been piling up over the years and many seem to be intractable. In this short paper it will not be possible to discuss these problems with any sense of justice.  I shall therefore merely enumerate them with brief elaborations.

         1. Physical Security.  The most basic task of a government is to provide law and order so as to ensure the physical safety and security of all that live within its gates.  There have been targeted assassinations of leaders of all sectors of government (ministers, legislators, judges, police officers and professionals).  For it is a well-known strategy of terrorists to strike first at the heart of security and law enforcement agencies.  There have been terrorist attacks and the planting of incendiary bombs in business areas which go off with alarming frequency and claim the lives of innocent people.  In short, Puntland’s record in this vital and most basic area of its tasks leaves much to be desired.  Externally too, Puntland has been unable to protect its territory from invasions by ‘Somaliland’.  It has also been vulnerable to pressures from the central regions.  Though it is scarcely likely that the central regions and ‘Somaliland’ will cooperate and coordinate a military campaign against Puntland, it is theoretically possible that they may do so - and God knows what Puntland’s state of preparedness for this possible eventuality is.

         2. Piracy.   Both the Somalis and the international community know full well that the problem of piracy is one which the international community has brought upon itself.  It is widely accepted and recognized that the problem started with ships from many countries illegally fishing in Somali waters but being even so willful and callous as to destroy the marine resources of the country and to chase out Somali fishermen.  It is a sad reality of life that the so-called ‘International System’ tramples the rights of the weak and protects the strong.  While so much hue and cry is usually raised in international conferences about the dangers of  ‘Somali piracy’ scarcely a word is uttered about the plight of the fishermen whose daily lives have been destroyed or the country whose marine treasures have robbed.  To this day, while pirates are being chased, illegal fishing goes on, destruction and stealing of marine resources goes on and the poor fishermen are still being forcibly denied their livelihood. Piracy has given a bad name to Puntland because it lays bare the sad fact that it does – more likely ‘cannot – control its territory.  In fact, there have been malicious accusations that there is a sort of sinister understanding between the pirates and Puntland administration.
         3. Weak Revenue Base. So far as I know an inordinately high percentage of Puntland’s revenue comes Bosaso port which is small but a bustling port serving large areas transcending its borders and extending far into ‘Somaliland’, Ethiopia, as well as regions in the south.  But, many of its own regions exist only in name and have no machinery of administration, no local government councils, and do not impose local taxes and do not therefore collect local revenue.  But those regions are not parasitic either because almost nothing comes to them from the Administration in Garowe and therefore Hylaan, Eastern Sanaag, Sool and Cayn have been deprived of any sense of belonging.  They are in Puntland because they do not want to be part of the secession that ‘Somaliland’ represents.
         4. Unity of Puntland.  The unity of Puntland has been tenuous ever since the state was established in 1998 because there has not been administrative or economic unity to give concrete meaning to the political unity that had been declared and given expression by creating a common legislature.  The unity of the state has been further dealt a blow by the fall of Las Anod to ‘Somaliland’ and the apparently tepid enthusiasm in Garowe to disgorge the occupying forces from it.
         5. Lack of A Professional Civil Service.  This problem is not of course peculiar to Puntland.  But that should not make it indifferent towards it because other administrations in Somalia, including the TFG, do not have it.  A professional civil service is expensive to have.   But never too expensive because it is an investment that gives huge dividends as long as it is properly maintained and cared for.   The human capital is the resource that can tap and transmute the other resources.  Conversely, an incompetent and unprofessional civil service is too expensive to have owing to endemic corruption, lack of capacity to formulate policies, and its inability to execute even laudable policies.

The above list of problems is by means no exhaustive, but I think all the other ills – economic and social – stem from these main ones.

What should Puntland do?

As always, it is easy to list the maladies and is difficult to prescribe the remedies.  Without being too prescriptive I would humbly suggest a few remedies as follows:

   1. First and foremost Puntland should start debating its draft constitution before it is put to a popular referendum, and the Diaspora community must contribute to the debate.  However, care must be taken to study it along with the draft constitution of the country as a whole so as to avoid articles that may  contradict the national constitution;
   2. I see a need for legislative reform.  Perhaps Puntland should consider having a bicameral legislature. It is a good idea to find a place in the legislative arena for the recognized ‘isims’[ traditional leaders] and create something akin to the Guurti of ‘Somaliland’.  I also think that the unicameral legislature that exists today is too small and should be expanded and be based on representation of towns and villages whose population is easier to determine rather than on arbitrarily decided sizes of sub-clans;
   3. There is a good and compelling argument for reducing the layers of government.  At present, we have four tiers of government – federal, state, regional and local. Of these, the regional level is clearly superfluous and needlessly adds to the complexity of the federal structure.  I read an interim report by the national constitutional committee which, clearly, does not envisage an intermediate level between the state and local levels.  Both Puntland and ‘Somaliland’ have unwisely proliferated their ‘regions’, instead of abolishing them, in order to satisfy the political demands of their clans, thus ignoring the question of their economic viability.  But, they may, in future, have to swallow the bitter pill of abolishing them altogether out of economic necessity;
   4. Getting rid of the regions will allow a greater catchment area for the local level in order to ensure its economic viability.  What is now called a ‘region’ should simply be divided into two, three or four (at the most) local areas, the ultimate, deciding factor being economic self-sufficiency.  But, devolution should be genuine, not illusory.  This will allow a healthy competition among the local levels, ensure development and relieve a lot of pressure (political and financial) from the state; weak councils may need subventions for development projects but there should be a fair formula.
   5. Puntland should establish a Local Government Institute to train the necessary cadres for the local councils, the councilors, as well as officials of the state ministry in charge of local government.  External training and assistance to finance study tours abroad should be sought in order to develop the necessary expertise;
   6. Of necessity there should be some features of deconcentration since central (state and federal) will have a local presence.  But, they should not allowed to dominate the structures of devolution;
   7. Last, but not least Puntland should improve its defense (both internally and externally) in order to provide unquestionable safety and security of its residents.  I realize that this is easier said than done and that it requires huge finances, for maintaining a well-equipped, well-trained, and well-disciplined forces for law and order and for preventing external aggression; else, the state will be distracted from its development functions and its residents will be insecure.

There is a lot more to be said, of course, in terms of improvements.  But there is need for Puntland to rethink, to reorganize and to reform.  I want to close this short paper with a pertinent quotation which every person who knows how a government should function and has the experience to know how it functions will appreciate as axiomatic: "If everything else is done, and public administration fails, all fails."

__________________________

**The author, Ismail Ali Ismail, is an expert in public policy with decades of practical experience in public policy as United Nations Senior Officer in many developing coun-
tries. Mr. Ismail has also been active in Somalia's public policy administration since before the independence. . He currently resides in Virginia USA and contributes to public affairs issues as a consultant , writer and commentator.

More insights on governance can be found in Mr. Ismail's book, Governance: Scourge and The Hope of Somalia

The original article appeared as an essay on Somalia Research Report ("SRR"), Issue #7, Volume 2, with Guest Editor, Abdul Ahmed III. Garowe Online republishes this material with permission from SRR and the author.