In the most perceptive analysis of the status and balance of forces in the conflict in the southern and central regions of Somalia that has been published in the period between mid-May and mid-June, Bernard Jopson of the Financial Times described on June 11 “a bloody stalemate in which no one wins.”

Jopson bases his conclusion on the fact that an offensive by the armed opposition to Somalia’s internationally engineered Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu in mid-May succeeded in driving the T.F.G. into the restricted areas protected by the African Union peacekeeping force (AMISOM), but then stalled, producing a stand-off that has prevailed since then. As Jopson reports, the opposition, which is a tactical alliance between the internationalist Islamist Al-Shabaab movement and the nationalist Islamist Hizbul Islam (H.I.), lacks the military power to break through the shield of AMISOM’s heavy weapons, whereas the T.F.G. does not have the capability of push back the opposition in Mogadishu, much less to extend its control to the other regions in southern and central Somalia where the opposition has military and political dominance.

Jopson’s analysis, which cuts through the heated and often triumphalist propaganda of all sides in the multi-faceted conflict, is taken here as the starting point for a more structural commentary that attempts to determine the conditions of the aptly characterized “bloody stalemate.”

The Conditions of Stalemate

Although the armed opposition failed to win the battle for Mogadishu in its first round, the success of the offensive in revealing the T.F.G.’s severe political and military weakness was a wake-up call to all domestic and external actors with an interest in preventing a takeover by the militant Islamists. The basic political dynamic from mid-May through mid-June has been efforts to reverse the momentum of the armed opposition, and attempts by the opposition to consolidate and expand its positions. The most important development in the situation, which makes it new, is that all of the interests that could conceivably be involved in the conflict are now mobilized with no actor remaining on the sidelines. The condition of complete mobilization brings the
current cycle of civil conflict in the southern and central regions to the brink of civil war (as it has been characterized by the editors of Garoweonline), in which the will to compromise vanishes, the space for negotiation disappears, and no honest brokers are to be found.

In a communication to this writer in June, a Somali source provided a keen understanding of the evolving domestic power configuration that sets the conditions for multi-faceted civil war. The source reports: “What I can see is a formation of two competing convenient alliances between opposition radical Islamists, Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab, against opportunist warlords, clan militias allied to the T.F.G., the T.F.G., Islamic Courts Union and now A.S.W.J. [Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama’a – the traditional Sufi Islam organization, which has become militarized].” The source’s assessment, which is fully consistent with independent daily monitoring of open sources, can be expanded to include external actors – Ethiopia, Kenya, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.), the African Union (A.U.), the United Nations, and the Western donor powers ranged in the International Contact Group (I.C.G.) – that
have adopted a line supporting a T.F.G. military push back against the “extremists.”

The key phrase in the Somali source’s assessment is “convenient alliances.” On
both sides of the superficial polarity are fragmented competing interests that render each coalition fragile. If the southern and central regions plunge into civil war, the conflict will not be a clear confrontation between two sides, but a multi-faceted struggle, in which each faction on each side will seek to gain its own advantage at the expense of both its “allies” and adversaries. The result is likely to be a parceling out of southern and central Somalia into contested and contesting fiefdoms, as was the case prior to the Islamic Courts revolution in 2006, which was aborted by an Ethiopian invasion at the end of that year and a subsequent occupation that was terminated a year later in the wake of an Islamist resurgence. The new wrinkle, as the Somali source notes, is that “with the involvement of political Islam, a once clan oriented conflict has now been further complicated by extreme Saudi influenced Wahabism and also not to forget traditional Somali Islam (Sufism).”

Signs of a looming civil war are ubiquitous. On the ground, armed conflict and preparations for it have spread throughout the regions of southern and central Somalia.

In the central region of Hiraan, clashes have erupted between militias loyal to the Islamic Courts Union (I.C.U.) administration, which is loosely allied to the T.F.G., and Al-Shabaab and H.I. forces; the region’s capital Beledweyne is divided between the I.C.U. and H.I.; and the T.F.G.’s minister of internal security, Col. Omar Hashi Adan – a former I.C.U. commander and colleague of the T.F.G.’s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad – has returned to the region leading a militia trained in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa has admitted to conducting “reconnaissance” operations in Hiraan and other regions bordering its ethnic Somali Ogaden region, and has been reported by local and international media to have based its troops in the regions. Former governor of Hiraan and warlord, Yusuf Dabaged, has also returned to the region, sparking disputes within the I.C.U. over whether to cooperate with him.

In the neighboring Galgadud region, there have been clashes between A.S.W.J. forces and Al-Shabaab and H.I. militants, with reinforcement of both sides reportedly underway. Again, Ethiopian troops have reportedly based themselves in areas currently controlled by A.S.W.J. On June 14, Shabelle Media Network reported that Ethiopian forces claimed that they had entered Galgadud to track down “foreign enemies” of Ethiopia.

In the Middle Shabelle region, which had been controlled by the I.C.U. and was the base of Sh. Sharif’s support, Al-Shabaab and H.I. captured the region’s capital Jowhar and other towns, and set up an administration, leaving the armed opposition, according to local media, dominant in four out of the region’s five districts. Middle Shabelle is Sh. Sharif’s birthplace and his only base outside the few areas in Mogadishu protected by AMISOM.

In the southwestern Gedo region, forces of warlord Barre Hirale were reported to have crossed the border from Ethiopia, promising to challenge Al-Shabaab and H.I. administrations throughout Somalia’s deep south. To the north of Gedo, the former T.F.G. administrations of the Bay and Bakool regions were reported to be mobilizing forces on the Ethiopian border. Ethiopian troops were reported to have crossed into Bakool and to have set up bases. The Al-Shabaab and H.I. administrations in the two regions have been reported to have mobilized for armed conflict.

In the southeastern Lower Jubba region, the tripartite Islamist administration has accused Kenya of mobilizing dissident militia on the border and has threatened to attack bases in Kenya’s Northeastern province, which has a majority ethnic-Somali population.

The broadening of the battle for Mogadishu into the regions, the return of the warlords, and the active intervention of frontline states is clear evidence of a building civil war. Taken together, the developments in the regions show that any pretense of reconciliation has been abandoned by the T.F.G. and its domestic and foreign supporters. Pushed against the wall, the desperate Sh. Sharif and Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke seem willing to welcome anyone into their fold on an expedient basis, or at least to acquiesce in their initiatives.

In Mogadishu, the pattern is the same. The despised warlord and former governor
of the Banadir region, Mohammed Dheere, has returned to the city to mobilize his
Mudolud sub-clan to support his former enemy and fellow clansman, Sh. Sharif. In
response, other sub-clans of the Hawiye clan family, ranged under the Tradition
and Unity Council (T.U.C.), which had been attempting to mediate between the
T.F.G. and the armed opposition, denounced Sh. Sharif for playing clan politics
and Al-Shabaab for sending fighters from southern clans into Mogadishu. The
other presumptive mediator – the Islamic Clerics Council – has not been heard
from. A source on the ground reports that Sh. Sharif has become increasingly dependent on narrow clan support.

On the military front, a counter-offensive by I.C.U. militias in Mogadishu on May 22 appeared at first to have made headway, but then stalled and was reversed. Since then, the “bloody stalemate” described by Jopson has prevailed, with the T.F.G.’s survival in Mogadishu dependent on AMISOM.

As Sh. Sharif desperately reached out to anyone who might help him, the T.F.G.’s weakness and loss of coherence became obvious. An editorial in the Somaliland
Times on June 11 pointed out the T.F.G.’s fundamental problem – a lack of domestic legitimacy: “...it is easy to see that most members of the so-called government do not have local constituencies from the fact that they cannot rally supporters. ... The bottom line is that most Somalis see the Sh. Sharif government as the weakest faction among several factions, and that by throwing their weight behind this faction, the U.S. and the international community are disenfranchising the rest of Somalis.”

Allowing for the position of the Somaliland Times in favor of Somaliland’s independence and for its opposition to the T.F.G.’s unionist policy, the editorial is a precise statement of the T.F.G.’s condition that is borne out by monitoring. In the face of the propaganda from external actors that the T.F.G. is “legitimate” and has the Somali people behind it, one must ask: If the T.F.G. is popular, why has there not been a wave of support for it throughout the southern and central regions? Why have the people not pressured their clan leaders to support the T.F.G.? Why have militia failed to put themselves squarely behind the T.F.G.? Why has there had to be a resort to despised warlords, Addis Ababa and now Nairobi, which has irretrievably lost its claim to its traditional policy of “equidistance”? The Somaliland Times is simply the
little boy in the fairy tale announcing the obvious fact that the emperor has no clothes. The T.F.G. is indeed the “weakest faction among several factions,” some of which are its supposed “allies.”

As for the international and regional organizations, and foreign powers upon which the T.F.G. depends militarily and financially for its existence, they have responded to the T.F.G.’s decline by holding a series of meetings marked by rhetorical support for their protege and denunciations of the armed opposition, and promises of practical aid, which has yet to materialize. In quick succession the sub-regional Inter-Governmental Authority of Development (I.G.A.D.), the African Union, the U.N. Security Council, and the Western-dominated International Contact Group (I.C.G.) have met and issued communiques and resolutions. In a telling indication of decreasing levels of support for the T.F.G. from the weakest external actors to the strongest, I.G.A.D., which is
composed mainly of frontline states, took the hardest line, appealing for an air and sea blockade of airports and seaports controlled by the opposition, to be enforced by the warships currently trying to suppress piracy off Somalia’s coast; and calling for robust military support of the T.F.G. The African Union echoed I.G.A.D., but did not emphasize international military support. The U.N.S.C. extended the mandate of AMISOM and failed to promise its replacement by a U.N. mission. The I.C.G. stated that I.G.A.D.’s proposals deserved consideration and repeated its tired call for the T.F.G. to reach out to reconcile with the armed opposition, while denouncing the latter.

It is clear that the most important of the external actors – the ones with the guns and money – are not eager to throw all their weight on the side of the T.F.G., whereas the dependent actors in the international coalition are experiencing severe strain. Despite their pledges of funds for AMISOM  and for training T.F.G. security forces, the big players continue to drag their feet, uncertain of the T.F.G.’s viability. As has been the case since the Ethiopian occupation, the Western powers’ half-heartedness opens the way for continued armed conflict and factionalization in southern and central Somalia. It is not worth detailing the (qualified) rhetorical optimism of the international coalition (to call it an “international community” is deeply misleading). In a strictly descriptive sense, the international coalition is simply hypocritical.

None of the above is meant to suggest that the armed opposition is deeply popular – although its successful establishment of administrations in the regions indicates minimally acquiescence and underlying clan support, at least in an expedient sense – and unified. H.I. is itself a coalition of resistance groups, each with its own interests; Al-Shabaab is increasingly described by journalists as a loose coalition; and H.I. and Al-Shabaab are opposed in terms of their ideological programs. Sh. Hassan Dahir Aweys, who returned to Mogadishu after the armed opposition’s offensive and took over as H.I.’s leader, was reported by local media to have attempted to negotiate with Al-Shabaab on forming a unified organization, and to have failed when the two sides could not agree on which group would fill key positions and how the organization would be named. Nonetheless, during the period from mid-May through mid-June, tactical cooperation between the two groups appears to have held up; both have a common interest at the present time in preserving their control in the regions and
fending off counter-offensives. The claim that they have no program and are simply spoilers, as the T.F.G., I.G.A.D., the A.U., and the U.N.’s special representative to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, tiresomely repeat to the donor powers, borders on political psychosis.

Conclusion

Piece together Jopson’s characterization of “bloody stalemate;” the Somali source’s description of factionalized “convenient alliances;” disruptive Ethiopian and possibly Kenyan intervention; and the half-hearted response of the donor powers, and the picture that emerges is one of incipient multi-faceted civil war. That picture, which is confirmed by monitoring of open sources and supplemented by contributions from closed sources, is likely to remain fixed, at least in the short term.

All the possible actors are mobilized, some more and some less. For the extant balance of power to change, an injection of momentum into one faction or another
will have to occur; at present, there is little prospect for that. One should bear in mind the Somaliland Times’ observation that the T.F.G. is “the weakest faction among several factions.”  Commenting on the I.C.G. meeting, Ould Abdallah told Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on June 12: “Surely, the international community will not allow any attempt to revolt against this legitimate authority and the elected president, as was the case last month.”  Also on June 12, the T.F.G.’s deputy prime minister, Abdirahman Aden Ibbi, told the Mareeg website: “The international community promised $256 million for the Somali government and the government did not get that amount of money so far. So they are too late for handing over that money to the transitional government of Somalia.”