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Somalia's Compromised National Reconciliation Conference
18 Jul 18, 2007 - 7:23:37 PM
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Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
http://www.pinr.com
On July 15, the long awaited, thrice delayed and
seriously compromised National Reconciliation
Conference (N.R.C.) -- aimed at beginning to
resolve Somalia's multiple conflicts -- was
kicked off, only to be abruptly adjourned, as
eight mortar rounds were fired at the meeting's
venue, a refurbished former police garage in the
country's official capital Mogadishu. The chair
of the commission that organized the conference,
Ali Mahdi Mohamed, said the adjournment was due
to the fact that only half of the 1,325
anticipated delegates had arrived; local and
international media, however, traced it to the
mortar attacks. The conference is scheduled to
reopen on July 19.
The N.R.C. is the
brainchild of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the
president of Somalia's weak Transitional Federal
Government (T.F.G.), which was pressured by
international donor powers -- the United States,
Western European states, the European Union and
the United Nations -- to initiate an inclusive
reconciliation process in the wake of the
Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in December
2006 that ousted the Islamic Courts Council
(I.C.C.) from its control over most of the
country south of the semi-autonomous sub-state of
Puntland. Addis Ababa had acted in the belief that
its intervention would establish the T.F.G. as a
pliant authority and eliminate a perceived
Islamist threat, but its result was the emergence
of a multi-faceted political and armed resistance
against the Ethiopian occupiers and the T.F.G.
Although the donor powers, particularly
Washington, were pleased to see the Courts
movement, which sought to create an Islamic state
in Somalia based on Shari'a law, defeated, they
were appalled by the resulting instability, which
threatened to drive Somalia back into the chaotic
statelessness that had prevailed there before the
rise of the Courts movement. Their preferred
solution was an inclusive reconciliation process,
held under their supervision, that would bring
together the T.F.G. and its non-violent political
oppositions in a dialogue that would isolate the
Islamist insurgency and pave the way for a
national accord.
The T.F.G. executive
saw the donors' plan, which would eventuate in
its sharing power with the oppositions, as a
threat to its interests in preserving its control
of formal institutions and the perquisites that
went along with it. Yusuf responded to
international pressure by devising an alternative
plan: a conference that would be organized by a
T.F.G.-appointed committee and would be based on
clan membership and representation rather than on
political divisions, would not be mediated by
external actors, and would exclude bargaining
over the structure of the T.F.G. or its
personnel.
The donor powers reacted
coolly to Yusuf's version of reconciliation, but
they were unwilling to impose their plan on him
and confined themselves to repeated appeals for
"inclusiveness," which were not heeded. Trapped
by their decision to support the T.F.G. as
Somalia's legitimate authority despite its
weakness, unpopularity and dependence for its
existence on the Ethiopian occupation, the donor
powers acquiesced in the N.R.C. Yusuf had scored
a decisive tactical victory, having finessed the
external actors.
During the month
since PINR released its last report on Somalia,
the country's politics has been dominated by the
run-up to the N.R.C. On the ground, violent
attacks on Ethiopian forces and T.F.G. militias,
including mortar fire, targeted assassinations of
officials, roadside bombings, shoot-outs and
grenade assaults, have been a daily occurrence.
In response, the Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces have
engaged in indiscriminate return fire, imposition
of a curfew, intensive weapons searches, arrests
of suspected insurgents and their supporters, and
raids on media houses, civil society
organizations, mosques, businesses and schools --
all in an attempt to secure Mogadishu ahead of the
N.R.C. On the political front, the T.F.G.'s
opponents have continued their process of
coalescing into a bloc and have refused to
participate in the N.R.C. through their clans.
The run-up to the N.R.C. and its truncated
opening confirm PINR's consistent assessment since
the Ethiopian intervention that Somalia has
entered a devolutionary cycle marked by regional,
local and clan fragmentation, with the addition of
political and ideological divisions, and a
revolutionary Islamist insurgency. The T.F.G.,
which admits that it needs external financial,
military and diplomatic support to survive, might
have scored a tactical success in evading serious
negotiations on power-sharing, but in the long
run it has only bought some time in a
deteriorating situation.
The Basic
Situation
Even if the N.R.C.
restarts and runs through its projected 45-day
course, it will be compromised from the outset by
Somalia's devolutionary cycle. The most incisive
analysis of the country's political situation
during the past month appeared in an interview
published by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) with the head of its
delegation for Somalia, Pascal Hundt, who
reported that the country is so insecure that "no
really effective [humanitarian] action is
possible, whether with regard to protection or
detention."
Hundt observed that the
"new phenomenon of insurrection" had rendered a
military solution to Somalia's conflicts
impossible, leaving only the possibility of a
political accord, and concluded that "the
solution has to come from the Somalis themselves
with massive and unified support from the
international community." He was unwilling to
predict any outcomes.
In his most
telling comment, Hundt said that he had trouble
"understanding the complex, varied and
ever-changing chains of command" among the
contending groups in Somalia -- a precise
characterization of the volatility that
characterizes devolution and fragmentation.
The I.C.R.C.'s judgments are in line with
those of PINR. When there is a power vacuum, as
there would be in Somalia were Ethiopian forces
not filling it temporarily, uneasily and
imperfectly, there is a retreat to more primary
solidarities. The absence of regularized
relations among the sub-groups leads to incipient
conflicts that break out sporadically or
chronically. In the general condition of
instability, the balance of power continually
shifts, prompting leaders of sub-groups to switch
allegiances in response to short-term calculations
of advantage. Even when the conflicts become
aggregated and polarized, the contending sides
are divided internally, rendering long-term
stability problematic and compromises tenuous.
As the devolutionary cycle in Somalia
deepens, the conditions for successful
reconciliation become far more difficult to meet.
In the absence of "massive and unified support"
from external actors, which has not been
forthcoming and is unlikely to be provided,
fragmentation proliferates and polarized
opponents become more unwilling to compromise.
As a tactic contrived in response to the
pressure of donor powers that is aimed at
avoiding a political solution, the N.R.C. does as
much or more to exacerbate devolution as it might
conceivably do to arrest and reverse it.
The Players Take Their Positions
Put in the bluntest terms -- and they are
justified -- the N.R.C. is a nuanced yet simple
power play by the T.F.G. executive to maintain
its position by keeping international financial,
military and diplomatic support; keeping the
Ethiopian occupation in place barring the
deployment of an adequate African Union (A.U.) or
preferably U.N. peacekeeping force; and
controlling the electoral process that is
supposed to result in a permanent government and
is mandated to take place in 2009. It is in the
T.F.G.'s interest to ride out the remainder of
the transition period and to prolong itself into
any permanent arrangement. Part of staying in the
saddle is to frame the reconciliation process to
accord with its interests, which it has done for
the time being, and to drag it out, attempting to
use clan negotiations to build support and, if
necessary, to divide and rule.
Given
the T.F.G.'s weakness and dependence on an
unpopular occupation, and the cool reaction of
donors to its reconciliation plan, it was an
achievement simply to mount the N.R.C. In its
last report on Somalia, PINR was doubtful that
the conference would be held. The insurgency had
become chronic and rooted in Mogadishu, there was
no indication that delegates were being selected
and the conference had no agenda. The Hawiye clan
family, which is dominant in Mogadishu, had
rejected participation in the N.R.C. unless a
long list of demands was addressed, and the
political oppositions were flatly
rejectionist.
What changed the picture
was the judgment of the donor powers that a
severely flawed reconciliation process was better
than none at all, given the severe strains placed
on Addis Ababa by the occupation, the failure of
force to crush the insurgency, the reluctance of
African states to contribute troops to a
peacekeeping mission without a peace to keep, the
growing danger that Islamist terrorist cells would
form in Somalia, a mounting humanitarian crisis
and a slide into the instability that accompanies
devolution.
Increasingly desperate to
halt the devolutionary cycle, the donor powers,
which control the purse strings of the
impoverished T.F.G., were divided on how to
approach the transitional executive, with
Washington adopting a qualified favorable line
toward the N.R.C. and Brussels deepening its
skepticism about it.
On June 15,
Washington released US$1.5 million to fund the
conference -- well short of the $32 million
requested by the T.F.G. and the $8 million that
it had been reported that donors had decided to
provide. On the same day, the U.N. Security
Council issued a presidential statement carrying
no binding authority that expressed "grave
concern" over attacks by "extremists" and "all
attempts to undermine" the N.R.C., and called on
all U.N. member states to cease support of
"extremists and spoilers." The statement went on
to emphasize the "urgent need" for the United
Nations to plan for a possible peacekeeping
mission and urged African states to contribute to
the A.U. peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), which has
only 1,600 Ugandan troops on the ground out of a
projected 8,000 multi-nation force.
The presidential statement accorded with
Washington's position that armed resistance to
the T.F.G. is the work of "extremist" jihadists
supported by Eritrea, which has a simmering
border dispute with Ethiopia and has provided
safe haven and a base for the political
oppositions to the transitional authority, and by
Arab states, which have interests in limiting
Addis Ababa's influence in the Horn of Africa.
Although Washington got the presidential
statement that it wanted, other external actors
expressed reservations. The U.N.'s
undersecretary-general for political affairs, B.
Lynn Pascoe, said that he would be "concerned" if
the N.R.C. were delayed yet again. The E.U.'s
commissioner for development and humanitarian
aid, Louis Michel, was more emphatic, stating
that the N.R.C. was "not working satisfactorily"
and that there was no excuse for postponing the
conference.
On June 16, U.S. Senator
Russ Feingold criticized the failure of the Bush
administration and the international community to
pressure the N.R.C. to undertake genuine
reconciliation, saying that the concerned
external powers should stop sending mixed
messages to the T.F.G. and should specify "clear
expectations" for the N.R.C., including the
requirement that the conference produce "an
outcome document laying out a roadmap for a
sustained and pervasive [reconciliation] process"
that would include "all stakeholders" and
incorporate international organizations as
observers. On June 18, the European Union
enhanced its diplomatic presence by appointing
Georges-Marc Andre as its special envoy to
Somalia.
In the last week of June, the
U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs reported that violence in Mogadishu had
spiked since the June 15 opening of the N.R.C.
was delayed, hindering delivery of aid.
Washington shifted its position to bring it more
into line with the E.U.'s, with the U.S. State
Department issuing a statement warning the
T.F.G.'s prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, that
efforts to undermine dialogue were "unacceptable"
and that arrests and detentions of "prominent
citizens" and harassment of "respected NGOs"
undermine efforts "for a national dialogue and
political reconciliation." Washington's growing
skepticism peaked in a BBC interview with U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Jendayi Frazer, who said that it was "difficult
to frankly say" that Somalia was currently better
off than it had been before the Ethiopian
intervention.
The picture changed
abruptly on July 3, when Andre praised the T.F.G.
for "reaching out" to the oppositions by including
"political issues" on the N.R.C.'s unspecified
agenda. On July 11, Andre led a delegation of the
Contact Group (C.G.), which brings together
Somalia's Western donor powers, to Mogadishu to
meet with T.F.G. officials and leaders of the
Hawiye clan. He commented after the discussions
that "we received good news and are going back
happy."
Taking the lead on the
diplomatic front, the E.U. held a joint meeting
with the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (I.G.A.D.) -- the regional
cooperation organization of Horn of Africa
states, in which Eritrea has suspended
participation -- on July 13, firming up the
consensus of external actors that there is only a
"political solution" to Somalia's conflicts and
that an "inclusive" N.R.C. that only leaves out
those who do not renounce violence is the means
to achieve it.
Although the intensive
behind-the-scenes diplomacy that led to the
consensus of donor powers to support the N.R.C.
has not been reported, it is clear that
Washington had joined Brussels in demanding
concessions from the T.F.G. and that Brussels was
satisfied with what the T.F.G. offered. On July
16, the N.R.C.'s organizing commission reported
that it had received $4.5 million for the
conference and pledges of $8.2 million that would
be given in staggered allotments dependent on the
conference's "progress" in achieving
reconciliation. Still, on July 18, a day before
the conference was to reopen, Gedi criticized the
donor powers for failing to provide adequate funds
even to transport delegates to the venue, warning
that unless more aid was made available, the
N.R.C. "might fail."
In PINR's
judgment, the concessions made by the T.F.G.,
which will be discussed below, do not ensure that
the N.R.C. will result in political reconciliation
and inclusive dialogue. The T.F.G. can be expected
to fight to keep control of the conference, and
the political opposition has thus far refused to
participate in it.
Determined to
remain in the saddle during the remainder of the
transition period and under pressure to include
all "stakeholders" in a political discussion, the
T.F.G. responded to the donor powers by making
mainly symbolic moves to placate them.
On June 17, the transitional parliament, based
in the town of Baidoa, discussed a proposal to
pardon members of Islamist militias and to
release former fighters and opposition
politicians from jail. On June 19, Yusuf signed
an amnesty decree, making clear that it did not
apply to "those with direct links with the
internationally wanted terrorists and those who
continue to pursue violence." Since then, the
U.N. has reported that the amnesty has had no
effect on the level of the insurgency, and the
I.C.C.'s political wing, led by Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed, has rejected it, with Ahmed
claiming that it is the T.F.G. that needs to beg
for pardon due to its "grave crimes against
Somalia's people, God and the country."
On June 24, the transitional parliament's
speaker, Sheikh Adan Madobe, said that the N.R.C.
organizers were "reaching out" to the Islamists
and dissident members of parliament based in
Eritrea, who could attend the conference if they
were chosen by their clan elders, and reaffirmed
the clan-representational formula of the N.R.C.,
which he claimed was "inclusive."
On
June 27, the commission chair Mahdi announced
that he had invited "some members" of the I.C.C.,
mentioning its former foreign affairs chief,
Ibrahim Hassan Adow, specifically, to attend the
N.R.C. On June 28, Adow said that Mahdi had
contacted him and other I.C.C. leaders in Sudan,
Eritrea and Qatar, and insisted that it was
"impossible for even one Courts official" to
participate in the N.R.C. as long as it was held
under the Ethiopian occupation.
On
July 5, in an interview with Ghana's
Accra
Daily Mail, Gedi clarified the nature and
purpose of the N.R.C., saying that the conference
"will start with the wider social reconciliation,"
taking the "first step" of "sorting out the
internal differences of the clans and sub-clans
of the Somali people." He insisted that the
T.F.G. was not ignoring the political dimension
of reconciliation, which would be dealt with at
the end of the transitional period when political
parties would be formed. On July 9, Mahdi echoed
Gedi, saying that the purpose of the N.R.C. would
be to "settle all grievances and grudges that each
and every Somali tribe harbors against one
another."
At the truncated opening of
the N.R.C. on July 15, Yusuf announced his
intention to remain in his post until the end of
the transition period. Press reports claimed that
the conference agenda would include disarmament, a
T.F.G. priority; clan reconciliation; compensation
for past abuses stemming from inter-clan
conflicts; and resource sharing, none of which
address political issues directly.
On
July 17, Awad Ashara, chairman of the
transitional parliament's Committee for
Information, Guidance and Culture, said that the
N.R.C. would produce a "binding document" based
on a "declaration of commitment to a future of
peace and tranquility" embodying justice,
democracy, fairness and equality -- the T.F.G.'s
conception of a roadmap.
On
July 17, Awad Ashara, chairman of the
transitional parliament's Committee for
Information, Guidance and Culture, said that the
N.R.C. would produce a "binding document" based
on a "declaration of commitment to a future of
peace and tranquility" embodying justice,
democracy, fairness and equality -- the T.F.G.'s
conception of a roadmap.
It appears
that the T.F.G. has come out with the edge in its
sparring match with the donor powers. Its refusal
to make the conference "political" rendered the
T.F.G.'s amnesty and its overtures to the I.C.C.
and parliamentary dissidents symbolic. The one
success of the T.F.G. in reaching out to the
oppositions was to engineer a split between the
Ayr and Abgal sub-clans of the Hawiye, persuading
the Abgal to send representatives to the N.R.C.,
which left the Ayr, from which the I.C.C. gained
its strongest support, in a more deeply
rejectionist position.
The oppositions
to the T.F.G. represent a diverse array of groups
and positions that are incipiently strained and
have coalesced around resistance to the Ethiopian
occupation and the transitional institutions,
which they consider to be Addis Ababa's
illegitimate pawns.
The military
opposition to the T.F.G. is centered in the
militant wing of the Courts movement -- primarily
the al-Shabaab militia, which now calls itself the
Youth Mujahideen Movement (Y.M.M.) -- that is
committed to the establishment of an Islamic
state in Somalia through armed revolution. The
Y.M.M. has claimed responsibility for many
attacks in Mogadishu, most recently the shelling
of the N.R.C.'s venue during the conference's
opening day, and has vowed to continue to disrupt
the proceedings. The Y.M.M. rejects not only the
N.R.C., but the political process itself, and is
the most important trigger for international
pressures to hold the N.R.C. and get a political
process underway that might isolate the militant
jihadists.
The Y.M.M.'s most prominent
supporter is Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the leader
of the militant wing of the Courts movement who is
in hiding from the T.F.G. and Ethiopians. In an
interview with al-Jazeera on June 23, Aweys vowed
that the resistance would overthrow the T.F.G. and
set up an Islamic state. On June 26, Aweys
presented his analysis of the situation in
Somalia to al-Jazeera, stating that the U.S. and
European states are propping up the T.F.G.
through their Ethiopian proxy because they fear
"the destruction of their system." According to
Aweys, Muslims face "a world war against the
possible establishment of an Islamic government
in the world."
The political
oppositions to the T.F.G. include the political
wing of the I.C.C., dissident members of the
transitional parliament led by former speaker
Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, nationalists opposed
to a clan-based formula for Somalia, sectors of
the Somali diaspora concentrated in the Somali
Diaspora Network (S.D.N.) and the Ayr sub-clan of
the Hawiye family, which has not joined the
coalescing political bloc that includes the other
opposition groups.
All of the
opposition groups fault the N.R.C. for its clan
formula, its nontransparent selection process and
its siting in Mogadishu, which is occupied by
Ethiopian troops. They argue that the clan
formula allows the T.F.G. to evade serious
power-sharing negotiations, that the selection
process has been controlled by the T.F.G. to its
advantage, and that the presence of the Ethiopian
forces in Mogadishu would subject opposition
figures who might attend to arrest and
intimidation, and renders free expression and
discussion impossible. Some of the opposition
groups also argue that the insecurity in
Mogadishu will not allow the N.R.C. to function
effectively. They say that if a reconciliation
conference is held, it must be sited at a neutral
venue and be based on political rather than clan
divisions.
Beyond their points of
agreement, the political oppositions diverge on
their aims and strategies, with the I.C.C.
remaining committed to an Islamist formula, the
nationalists to an ethnic-Somali state and the
S.D.N. to a reconciliation process in which the
T.F.G. has no control over the selection process
and does not host the conference, and which would
lead to a "legitimate unity government that would
prepare the way for democratic elections in
2009."
Although the nationalists would
prefer a unified opposition movement, the I.C.C.
is insistent on maintaining its organizational
independence, rendering the oppositions a
coalition rather than an incipient party.
Nevertheless, on July 12, the oppositions made
their decisive break with the N.R.C. by
announcing that they would hold their own
"constituent congress" on September 1 with the
aim of "liberating Somalia from the yoke of the
Ethiopian occupation." On the same day, the
spokesman for the Ayr sub-clan, Ahmed Diriye,
announced that the Ayr would not attend the
N.R.C., summarizing the general opposition
objections to it: "The conference would make
sense if it was bringing rival politicians and
armed groups to the same table. But if the idea
is to talk about non-existent tribal conflict,
it's a waste of money and energy."
The
announcement of the oppositions' constituent
congress marks the failure of the T.F.G. to mount
an inclusive reconciliation process aimed at a
"political solution." Like the T.F.G. executive,
the oppositions are likely to attempt to ride out
the transition period, attempting to marshal
resources, build support and "undermine" the
T.F.G. If that scenario plays out, the
devolutionary cycle in Somalia will deepen. The
only thing that would change the picture would be
the highly unlikely success of the N.R.C. in
drawing broad public support based on "progress"
in reconciliation; were that to happen, some of
the opposition factions might join the
process.
The prospects for
reconciliation through the N.R.C. became even
more dim on July 18, when Somalia's civil society
organizations, whose participation in the
conference is essential according to the donor
powers, announced that they would not attend. The
coordinator of the civil-society groups' council,
Abdikafi Hilowle Usman, stressed that Somalia's
conflicts are political disputes, not clan
rivalries, concluding that "there will be no
outcome" from the N.R.C. and that "it is
important to postpone it."
Conclusion
On July 14,
McClatchy Newspapers published parts of a recent
U.S. intelligence briefing on Somalia, to which
it had gained access. The report stated that the
T.F.G. is perceived by Somalis as "little more
than a pawn of Ethiopia, yet its continued
survival, certainly in Mogadishu, remains
dependent on the support of the Ethiopian
military." Under those conditions, the report
goes on, extremists are able to "regain their
footing and heighten inter-state tensions."
On July 13, in an interview with Agence
France-Presse, Roland Marchal of the Center for
International Studies and Research in Paris,
commented that Somalia's conflicts are not rooted
in clans, but in political and military divisions.
For Marchal, the N.R.C. is a product of
international pressure on the T.F.G., yet "the
international community has been deficient on the
political issue." He continued that there would be
no cease-fire in the absence of "politically
inclusive talks," offering that "alternatively
you can pretend to have won, like it was done in
Iraq and Afghanistan."
PINR has
reached the same conclusions as Marchal and the
U.S. intelligence report, based on data from its
own monitoring project. The N.R.C. is a tactical
victory for the T.F.G. executive, yet it
represents not a "first step" up in the
reconciliation process, but another step down in
Somalia's devolutionary cycle.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest
News Report (PINR) is an independent organization
that utilizes open source intelligence to provide
conflict analysis services in the context of
international relations. PINR approaches a
subject based upon the powers and interests
involved, leaving the moral judgments to the
reader. This report may not be reproduced,
reprinted or broadcast without the written
permission of enquiries@pinr.com.
PINR reprints do not qualify under Fair-Use
Statute Section 107 of the Copyright Act. All
comments should be directed to comments@pinr.com.
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