by Faizal Mohamud

After all its endeavours failed to stabilize Somalia, the United States has upgraded its role of involvement to arming one side of the conflict to defeat the “radical” Alshabaab Almujahideen, an Islamist group that has taken over most of Southern Somalia soon after Ethiopian troops withdrew from the country in January and is linked to Alqaeda by Washington.

For many Somalis who have been anticipating change of policy from the new administration of Barrack Obama, this blueprint of exporting weapons to chaotic Somalia was a startling move, as it would negatively impact on the security and stability of, not only Somalia but the whole conflict-prone Horn of Africa.

Somali arms for all

From the cold war, through the collapse of the central government in 1991 to the Islamist era, Somalia has been awash with different types of arms and weapons dumped on by Cold War rivalries and feuding neighbours contending to manipulate Somali politics. The object lesson we have learnt from past arms-shipments made to Somalia was that weapons have no exclusiveness, benefiting the unintended and the favourites equally. This means weapons are commonly shared commodity in Somalia, or simply are like rented cars for all parties in Somalia, including Islamist fighters and local bandits likewise. That is apparently the fact that worries some analysts and conflict-watchers who have emerged to lament the move.

Right, the United States is worried about the increasing authority of Alshabaab, who are close to oust the government, has it not been guarded by the African Union peacekeepers, which their presence in Somalia is the fundamental cause of the conflict. But sending weapons to a war torn nation with no well-established security forces is not an option.

As the chairman of the then “Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) – an umbrella for all Islamist fighters in 2006-, President Sharif could tour all corners of Mogadishu without guardian. Today, he cautiously holds press conferences in his Palace, surrounded by African Union Peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi. The distinction between that high steam he had enjoyed in 2006 and his present-day unpopularity remarkably demonstrates the core issue of the conflict, ‘an inflexible religious ideology that would haunt anyone who introduces reform or succumb to the Western hegemony’.

When the international community pressed the inclusion of Islamist moderates to the feeble Transitional Federal Government (TFG), their prime objective was to isolate the radical wing of the Islamists. On contrary, the proposal rejuvenated the insurgency where various groups unified their operations to abort their imminent threat-moderate Islamist-led government.

Notably, it was the reliance on President Sharif’s clan and religion advantage to subdue the hardliners that former president Abdullahi Yusuf was forced to resign by the international community after the United States and its regional ally-Ethiopia made him a scapegoat for the international failure in Somalia.

Why such imagination (that modern Islamist can defeat radicals) has not materialized is that the international community underestimates the dynamics of the endless insurgency. Disregard to clan affiliations and animosity towards tribalism is what props up Alshabaab and plays an important role in its recruitment.

Somalis are tired of endless conflict, bloodshed, injustice, clan-based marginalisation and global negligence invoking desperation for Sharia law which they believe could only address their suffering. (This does not necessarily mean that Somalis support Alshabaab’s strict form of Islam, but trust their loyalty).

Therefore, the revitalization of tribe issue by Sheikh Sharif with the support of international and regional powers (arming his tribal militias, reinstalling the warlords) would only undermine the legitimacy of his feeble government. In Somalia today, many people are cautious about the current infighting and believe that all parties to the conflict are carrying out foreign agendas, one for Alqaeda and the other for the West. For instance, Ahmed Hassan Had, an outspoken leader of the Hawiye Elder’s Commission, has called for all warring parties, including the government not to draw another occupation for the country, an allusion to another Ethiopian intervention.

US Interventions

In the past, United States has made various direct or indirect interventions in Somalia which have been counter-productive.

Early in 2006, US backed Somali warlords who had formed an “Alliance of Peace Restoration and Counter-terrorism” and immediately clashed with the “Union of the Islamic Courts” headed by now president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. However, Islamists with public support defeated the warlords forcing them to flee the country in humiliation. That was unbelievable, historic victory against long time barriers to peace and stability in Somalia.

Supporting the warlords whose only aim had been to reinforce lawlessness, US overlooked the Interim Government which was at the time based in Baidabo, 240Km away from Mogadishu, struggling for survival. Washington argued that the Interim Government had been so vulnerable to hunt down the terrorists who had master-minded the 1998 Bombing of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

But after its allied warlords had been defeated, Washington was not left any other option but to support the Interim Government and back Ethiopian intervention to oust the UIC as the TFG was powerless. (Washington has never said clearly it had directed Ethiopia to invade Somalia, but Jendayi Frazer, Bush administration’s under secretary for African affairs said in 2007 they had advised Ethiopia not to interfere and supported when Ethiopia started the invasion!)

Initially, the Ethiopian intervention seemed successful; the Islamic Courts had been defeated; its high profile leaders including the current president escaped to Eritrea, but at the end government forces and Ethiopian troops were caught up in an endless insurgency.

Violence intensified

Since Sharif was elected as president in January, the violence has escalated in Mogadishu, clashes between the government and its Islamist opposition have been nearly daily. Government forces have been defeated in most of the clashes and Alshabaab has exerted control over Southern regions in Somalia, isolating the government. Alshabaab’s efforts to foil the government by targeting the president have been blocked by strong African Union Peacekeepers who protect key places in the capital including the presidential palace, the airport, and the main sea-port, enough for the president not to miss international and regional summits.

In June, Alshabaab carried out their most serious attack against the government after launching a suicide attack in Balawein, which killed the Security minister and former ambassador to the African Union (AU) and Ethiopia, who had been planning a large offensive against Islamist insurgency in the central regions of Somalia.

TFG Failure

The reason behind the government’s failure is not due to scarcity of arms and weaponry, the incompetence of the TFG could be blamed on several factors ranging from poor leadership, corruption, nepotism to lack of finance which triggers mass defection of its troops. Therefore, US weapons wouldn’t empower the TFG or tackle the insurgency until these underlying problems are solved.

The arms flow could only further worsen the situation, and would increase the number of civilian casualties depending on the nature of weapons. Uranium and white-phosphorus containing weapons could endanger the life of civilians who survived the brunt of deadly insurgency and civil war.

More over, weapons could fall into the hands of Islamist insurgents or other armed mobs which could increase the scale of the conflict and may have long term serious impact on the regional stability.

Therefore, western powers should avoid seeking their interests at the expense of innocent civilians by prioritizing counter-terrorism over human rights as it would give the culprits a cause to continue the war, because the current radicalisation in Somalia itself is the by-product of protracted international failures and counter productive policies.

The writer is a Somali journalist and can be reached at journo20@gmail.com