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| Last Updated: Dec 15, 2011 - 11:05:44 AM |
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Somalia: After the Kampala Bombings, the Endgame in Mogadishu [Intelligence Brief]
5 Aug 5, 2010 - 2:25:06 PM
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By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
A closed source, who has proven to be reliable and is on the ground in Somalia, reports on the current balance of power in Mogadishu between the revolutionary Islamist movement Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.), which holds most of the city and surrounds its adversaries, and Somalia’s internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) and the African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) that provides for the T.F.G.’s essential protection.
The bottom line of the source’s intelligence is that in the month following the July 11 World Cup bombings in Kampala, for which H.S.M. has taken responsibility, the Islamists have improved their position in relation to their opponents in Mogadishu.
The strategic intention of H.S.M. in executing the bombings has been a matter of speculation among analysts, journalists, and officials of the governments and international organizations backing AMISOM and the T.F.G. – Western donor powers led by Washington and the United Nations and African Union. H.S.M. has characterized the bombings as revenge for AMISOM shelling of civilian areas of Mogadishu and as a warning to Uganda and Burundi, whose forces are the only participants in AMISOM, that they should withdraw from Mogadishu, and to other African states that they should not contribute troops to the mission. Western analysts and Washington have called the bombings an act of desperation by H.S.M., which they claim is divided and has lost popular support. Prof. Kenneth Menkhaus has argued that H.S.M. was probably attempting to re-ignite support by regionalizing its war and mobilizing Somali nationalism. Both Menkhaus and Rashid Abdi of the International Crisis Group contend that the bombings will work to cut off financial support to H.S.M. from the Somali Diaspora.
The source provides an explanation for the bombings that is at variance with both H.S.M.’s accounts and Western speculation. According to the source, the bombings were aimed at mobilizing support from the transnational Salafist revolutionary movement; that is, a show by H.S.M. that it is a powerful presence and, therefore, is worth being funded. The source reports that H.S.M.’s propaganda of the deed has been effective: more funds are flowing into Mogadishu for H.S.M.’s operations. The source is not sure, however, that the flow will continue.
The claim that H.S.M.’s resources are increasing runs counter to ubiquitous reports that the Islamists are financially strapped. In a news-feature published on August 4, Kenya’s Star newspaper reported that H.S.M. was suffering a “financial squeeze” resulting from the withdrawal of World Food Program aid from the areas it controls, making it impossible for H.S.M. to tax food convoys. The Star also reported that funds from the Diaspora were drying up, quoting an interview with Rashid Abdi, who emphasized a drop in support from the Diaspora in the U.S. According to the Star, H.S.M. is currently dependent on revenues from the ports that it controls and “extortion” payments from businessmen.
The source also challenges reports in the East African press, especially Uganda’s government-owned New Vision, and statements by AMISOM spokesman Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku, that AMISOM forces have made strategic gains on the ground in areas surrounding key T.F.G. installations, particularly the presidential palace. According to the source, AMISOM has not retaken ground lost in previous H.S.M. offensives and, indeed, “continues to inexorably lose ground.” The source observes that a projected increase of AMISOM’s forces from the current six thousand to ten thousand will only serve to protect AMISOM from being overrun by H.S.M.
Confirming reports in international, regional, and local Somali media, the source observes that Mogadishu’s population has been disaffected from AMISOM, due to the latter’s decision to respond to H.S.M. attacks by heavily shelling the city’s neighborhoods. Keeping count one night, the source tallied at least 150 artillery rounds. The source judges that most of Mogadishu’s residents would prefer AMISOM to remain in the city to prevent a complete H.S.M. takeover, but that the people’s patience has worn thin.
The most devastating of the source’s observations concerns the non-viability of the T.F.G., a judgment that is shared by a consensus of Western and Somali analysts. The source, however, goes further than the analyst community, asserting that the T.F.G. has given up and has entered a phase in which its officials are “looting whatever they can.” The source reports that T.F.G. officials are threatening local leaders with being branded as supporters of H.S.M. if they do not cooperate in diverting resources to them. Non-governmental organizations, says the source, have also become targets of T.F.G. predation.
Taken together, H.S.M.’s enhanced resources, AMISOM’s inability to gain ground and the disaffection created by its use of artillery, and the T.F.G.’s implosion have resulted in a re-calculation of interests by Mogadishu’s sub-clan leaders, who have become convinced that the donor powers will not change their current policy of maintaining the status quo. Barring an implemented policy shift by the donors, the sub-clan leaders feel pressured to go over to H.S.M. or at least to adopt a stance of benevolent neutrality towards the Islamists. A change in sub-clan positions in favor of H.S.M. is geared to a time frame ending in January 2011, when the T.F.G.’s mandate officially expires. If donor policy does not change by the end of October 2010, says the source, the tilt towards H.S.M. will begin.
If the source’s intelligence, observations, and judgments are accurate, correct, and sober, then the conclusions are clear: the T.F.G. is a wasted and toxic asset for the donor powers; AMISOM, saddled with a peacekeeping (defensive) rather than a peace-enforcement (proactive) mandate, is in an increasingly untenable position; and the donor powers’ disposition to procrastinate has become starkly self-defeating – leaving H.S.M with greater advantage than it had before the World Cup bombings. The foregoing means that the endgame in Mogadishu has begun.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago
weinstem@purdue.edu
©2010 All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this article for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Rebublication or redistribution of this report, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Garowe Online
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