Somalia
Al-Shabab Implements its Encirclement Strategy [Intelligence Update]
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Jan 3, 2010 - 1:17:51 PM

By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

On January 2, Somali and international media widely reported that the forces of the Salafist-jihadist Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.) had attacked and gained control over the town of Dhusamareb, the capital of Somalia’s central Galgadud region, which had been held by its rival in the region, the Sufi movement Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (A.S.W.J.), which is backed by local militias and is reportedly supplied and supported by Ethiopia.

Reports were contradictory, with some news outlets saying that H.S.M. had prevailed after heavy fighting, others saying that H.S.M. had met with little resistance from A.S.W.J., and others saying that A.S.W.J. had mounted a counter-attack and had regained control over parts of the town. On January 3, there were reports that A.S.W.J. had retaken Dhusamareb, but that tensions in the area remained high as both sides prepared for further armed conflict.

Whatever the outcome of the conflict turns out to be, the attack on Dhusamareb confirms the intelligence reported by this writer in Garowe Online on December 8, 2009 that H.S.M. has adopted a strategy of encircling Somalia’s weak and internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) in Mogadishu by achieving dominance in the central regions of Hiraan, Galgadud and southern Mudug. Should H.S.M. succeed in capturing Dhusamareb and then extend its sway to strategic towns in Galgadud, such as Guri-el, Abudwaq, and Balanbal, which remain A.S.W.J. strongholds, the balance of power between H.S.M. and the variegated coalition resisting it in the central regions and in southern and central Somalia in general will be decisively altered. Although A.S.W.J. is only partially aligned with the T.F.G., the former’s control over Galgadud – a buffer region between the Hiraan region to the west, in which the nationalist Islamist Hizbul Islam movement (H.I.) and H.S.M. are dominant and dispute and collaborate; and the Middle Shabelle region to the east, in which H.S.M. predominates – has been one of the most important pillars of the anti-H.S.M. coalition’s aim of rolling back H.S.M., which is currently dominant in most of southern and central Somalia; the noose around the T.F.G. will tighten, which is the aim of the encirclement strategy. At the least, Galgadud has been thrown into contention and A.S.W.J.’s credibility as a resistance force against H.S.M. has been thrown into question.

The source of the December 8 report had anticipated that H.S.M. would move first against H.I. in order to take command over the armed Islamist movement and thereby consolidate its power. Instead, H.S.M. has attempted to conciliate with H.I. in Hiaraan and has moved directly against a more important and irreconcilable opponent, A.S.W.J.

Although the decisional processes of H.S.M. are not readily accessible to outsiders, its decision to attack Dhusamareb is intelligible in terms of A.S.W.J.’s efforts from mid-December into January to form a permanent administration in Galgadud. In a later communication, the source of the December 8 intelligence reported that Ethiopia – the muscle behind much of the anti-H.S.M. coalition – would move into Galgadud to protect A.S.W.J.’s conference on creating an administration for Galgadud. It is likely that H.S.M. moved to derail the conference, which it succeeded in doing on January 2, when A.S.W.J. suspended the conference for two weeks, as its attention became fully absorbed in tightening security in the towns that it controlled, and in preparing for a counter-offensive against H.S.M. in Dhusamareb.

Run-Up to Dhusamareb

The stage was set for a confrontation between H.S.M. and A.S.W.J. on December 13, when an A.S.W.J. delegation led by Sh. Mahmud Sh. Hasan Farah met in Addis Ababa with Ethiopia’s foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin. A press release from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Hasan had told Mesfin that A.S.W.J. would hold a conference and had asked Mesfin to mediate its disputes with the T.F.G. Hasan expressed concern over the emergence of a “parallel” A.S.W.J. movement and urged the T.F.G. to cooperate in maintaining A.S.W.J.’s “unity.,” Hasan pointed out that A.S.W.J. had confronted H.S.M. thirty times and had won each time, and criticized the T.F.G. for failing to honor a previous agreement on security, claiming that had the T.F.G. held up its end of the bargain, the conditions would have been in place for weakening and eventually wiping out H.S.M. and H.I.

On December 18, Ethiopian troops crossed into Galgadud, set up positions in the town of Balanbal, and conducted search operations. On the same day, H.S.M.’s commander in the Hiraan region, Sh. Abukar Ali Adan, announced that H.S.M. had “close working relations” with H.I. and that the two groups were in the final stages of forming unified local administrations in Hiraan.

Abandoning Dhusamareb for the town of Abudwaq, the leadership of A.S.W.J. opened its conference on December 20 with Hasan in the chair. It was reported that A.S.W.J. had sent invitations to other regional administrations and the T.F.G.; further reports did not mention any other participants than the A.S.W.J. delegates – more than 200 from different regions of post-independence Somalia and the diaspora.

The agenda of the conference was to formulate policy for opposing the Islamists, to determine how A.S.W.J. might support other regional administrations and the T.F.G., and to create one super-administration for areas in the central regions under A.S.W.J.’s control. On December 22,  committees were set up to work out the form of administration for the central regions.

On December 31, the new administration began to take shape; delegates elected a 41-member parliament, which in turn elected a speaker and a deputy speaker. Two days, earlier, Ethiopia had withdrawn its forces from Balanbal. On January 1, the governor of the H.I. administration in Hiraan, Sh. Shuriye Afrah Sabriye, declared war on A.S.W.J. in Dhusamareb and Guri-el, accusing the group of being Ethiopian pawns. On January 2, H.S.M. struck Dhusamareb.

Analytical Note

The most telling feature of the period between mid-December and early January in Galgadud is the apparent confidence of A.S.W.J. in its effort to consolidate and institutionalize the power that it thought that it had in the central regions. The leadership of the movement abandoned Dhusamareb and decamped for Abudwaq where it held protracted negotiations. When the parliament was about to be set up, Ethiopia withdrew from Balanbal – an indication that Addis Ababa also had confidence in A.S.W.J.’s control of the situation, unless there is more than meets the eye. The run-up to Dhusamareb indicates that both A.S.W.J. and Ethiopia had grossly underrated H.S.M.’s power, and had not understood and taken into account H.S.M.’s encirclement strategy.

Whereas there was reporting on A.S.W.J. during the run-up to Dhusamareb, there was not a word from open or closed sources about H.S.M.’s preparations for an assault on the capital. The attack and especially its coordinated force came as an apparent surprise to all the actors but H.S.M.

H.S.M. is currently the protagonist in southern and central Somalia and its leadership knows that it is. In the sense of international recognition, the T.F.G. is Somalia’s “legitimate” government and H.S.M. and H.I. are the “armed opposition”; in the sense of power and momentum, the T.F.G. and the rest of the anti-H.S.M. coalition (warlords, clan politicians, A.S.W.J., Ethiopia, other regional powers, Western great powers, the African Union, and the United Nations) form a variegated and divided opposition to H.S.M. Despite reported divisions within H.S.M., its two contending factions made a demonstration of unity on January 1 at a ceremony in Mogadishu showing off hundreds of newly trained H.S.M. fighters. Despite its conflict with H.I. in the deep southern regions, H.S.M. appears to be able to collaborate with H.I. tactically and, perhaps, strategically elsewhere.

H.S.M. is confident. H.S.M. is implementing a strategy. Can the same be said for its opposition? At present, H.S.M. has momentum.

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University weinstem@purdue.edu

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