With the cautious Western donor and military powers on the sidelines – with a foot gingerly pressed on the playing field – the stand-off between the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its armed opposition, mainly composed of the transnationalist Islamist Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen or Youth Mujahideen  Movement (Y.M.M.), and the nationalist Islamist Hizbul Islam (H.I.), has persisted in Mogadishu through mid-August. Armed clashes have continued, but there has been no perceptible change in the balance of power, in which the opposition surrounds the territory protected by AMISOM that consists of key political and transportation infra-structure; but is unable to break through its armor. Meanwhile Somalia’s internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), which AMISOM is charged with defending from attack, has become a “ghost government,” as Somali political intellectual Mohamud Uloso calls it. 

The stand-off covers the moves being made by both sides to prepare for major battle, as closed sources in the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula have reported. 

Closed-Source Assessments 

The first source reports on the strategy of the armed opposition,  agreeing with the public statement by the Y.M.M. that it would replicate its tactics against the 2007-2008 Ethiopian occupation of drawing the enemy into armed responses that alienate the population and disturb domestic opinion. The armed opposition, says the source, plans a six-month war of attrition in which it picks off AMISOM forces on a regular basis. The opposition believes that such a strategy would work to make domestic support for AMISOM beyond repair in states that contribute to the force – Uganda and Burundi. Meanwhile, says the source, AMISOM  is immobilized, waiting for T.F.G. forces to take the initiative, which is an indulgence in fantasy. 

The second source reports on the strengthening of the armed opposition militarily and diplomatically. The source says that 15 thousand opposition fighters are being trained in Merka, the capital of the Lower Shabelle region, which is the center of power for the hardline faction of Y.M.M., in order to wage a publicly-announced jihad against AMISOM during the month of Ramadan. The source also reports that the preponderance of Arab countries have come to view the Y.M.M. “as their only available alternative,” adding that Arab support has set up a process of change in the Y.M.M.’s “political stand.” 

The third source reports on the AMISOM side of the equation, saying that the mission is looking for legal grounds to expand its activity from peacekeeping to peace enforcing without an expansion of its present United Nations peacekeeping mandate. The source adds that the decision makers in the African Union and AMISOM “are in a state of denial.” 

If what the sources say is true in whole or parts, then the armed opposition has become stronger during the stand-off and has a clearly defined strategy, whereas AMISOM is sharply restricted by the Western powers and is forced to play defense in a waiting game. The stand-off, says the first source, “systematically gives the opposition the advantage.” 

Context 

Open-source corroboration of the structure of the stand-off was provided by Somali analyst Ali Abdullahi in an August 11 interview with Voice of America’s Peter Clottey.  Remarking that the T.F.G. “does not have anyone to fight for them,” Abdullahi added that the Y.M.M. “has a lot of spirit and they have a well-disciplined group of militants and the government is not well prepared to challenge them on the battlefront.” Abdullahi reports that clan militias are deserting the T.F.G. and that a “peaceful party” is being organized to provide an alternative to the T.F.G. for external actors. Abdullahi concludes that “most of the Somali elite don’t see this government as representative of them.” 

Abdullahi’s assessment provides a corrective to the analysis widely circulated by Somalia expert Prof. Kenneth Menkhaus that the Y.M.M. is losing support in Somali society. That analysis has been hyped-up by Washington Post correspondent Stephanie McCrummen who threatens to become the Judith Miller of Somalia reporting. The Y.M.M.’s momentum is at least an open question. 

The armed opposition has remained quiet about their intentions publicly through mid-August, except for the Y.M.M.’s call for jihad during Ramadan. The same was not the case for AMISOM, which persists in its radically compromised position. The third source’s remark on “a state of denial” among decision makers is balanced by the first source’s comment that AMISOM’s forces on the ground are perfectly aware of the threat that they face. 

In a cautious, nuanced and diplomatic analysis, Lt. –Col. Felix Kulaligye, the spokesman for the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (U.P.D.F.), concluded that there are “increased worries about the [U.N.] Security Council’s ability to address serious threats to international peace and security.” Kulaligye spoke of a “new international security management paradigm,” in which regions and sub-regions “assume co-responsibility” for conflict resolution. On the ground, AMISOM spokesman Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku denied all pretensions to peace enforcement by AMISOM, saying, “We are a peacekeeping force. We do not leave our camps.” Ba-Hoku added that AMISOM had proven that “Somalia’s conflict is surmountable.” 

Questioning of AMISOM continued in Uganda with the country’s auditor general, John Muwanga, accusing the Defense Department of using public monies to finance the mission to make up for arrears from the A.U., which is supposed to fund it; and of having bank accounts administered by itself without oversight and approval from other state bodies. Muwanga’s accusations spurred the political opposition to demand repayment from the Defense Department. Kulaligye responded that the A.U. would make up the arrears, adding that the U.P.D.F. could “not be expected to account for money” that it gets from the A.U. and was never approved by parliament. 

On August 16, Press TV reported widespread fighting in several districts of Mogadishu near AMISOM’s base. Press TV said that AMISOM had “expanded their operations” against the Y.M.M. in districts where the T.F.G. claims that the Y.M.M. is using residents as “human shields.” The fighting has appeared to have resulted in T.F.G. militias retaking some areas that had fallen to the opposition in the spring.   

From the T.F.G. came a statement on August 14 by its new interior minister, Mohamed Abdullahi, that the T.F.G. was holding “indirect talks” with Y.M.M. “commanders” and “high-profile members “ of H.I., and had been getting “quite positive signals.” “In the coming weeks there would be a good development,” he said. 

Adding to the complexity is a report from August 7 on the Allpuntland website that Washington, Addis Ababa and the T.F.G. had formulated a “six-sided plan” as a result of Washington’s successful brokering of talks between the other two in which they had “reconciled their differences” and done away with their “widespread suspicion of each other.” The next step would be to mount attacks on the armed opposition in various regions with a mélange of anti-opposition forces, presumably warlord militias and the forces ranged under the Sufi movement Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama’a (A.S.W.J.). 

The report was echoed by Sh. Mohamed Ibrahim Bilal speaking for the Somali Islamic Council who accused the T.F.G. of giving responsibility to AMISOM for the recapture of Mogadishu and to Ethiopia for the recapture of the Bay region. 

Signs that the “six-sided plan” was in motion appeared on August 17, when A.S.W.J. was reported to have captured the town of Bulo-Hawo in the southwestern Gedo region from the Y.M.M., which had held it previously and withdrew without a fight. The opposition administration in the town of Bardheere in the Gedo region imposed a curfew there and stepped up security patrols. 

Conclusion 

The foregoing compilation of closed- and open-source assessments, possible strategies and forecasts indicates a ferment of repositioning going on among the major actors directly involved in the armed stand-off in Mogadishu. The situation is currently fraught with uncertainty and raises questions rather than evincing conclusive tendencies. 

Will the Y.M.M. carry out a well-organized campaign of attrition against AMISOM? Will AMISOM remain a peacekeeping force defending its bases or become a peace enforcement mission taking clear sides in a civil war? Are the Y.M.M. and H.I., or factions within them, susceptible to negotiations? Is the T.F.G. susceptible to negotiations when it is in a weak bargaining position? Will Uganda’s president, Yowahari Museveni, face increased opposition to the AMISOM commitment? Are the Y.M.M. and H.I. gaining or losing strength? Is there an operational “six-sided” plan to provoke a full-scale civil war? Will the Western military and donor powers support a robust military push or will they continue to be cautious? 

As has been the case before, since the Islamic Courts revolution of 2006, actors are making their calculations on the basis of what they perceive to be other actors’ calculations and resources. Although that is always the case in political conflict, it has become, at the moment, exaggerated, which proliferates uncertainty and increases the probability of miscalculation by one or more actors. In summary judgment, the pieces of the puzzle do not fit together neatly, but, as the first source said, they show the armed opposition with a systematic advantage. 

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University
weinstem@purdue.edu

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