By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

Galkaio Agreement

A draft, provided by a closed source, of a major report on Somalia being prepared for publication by the International Crisis Group (I.C.G.) comments on the deepening political-territorial fragmentation of the country and makes the consequent judgment, in light of the conjuncture of actors involved in its conflicts, that “Somalia” has been brought into question as a possible organized political entity.

The report is concentrated on the failure of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) to unify the country, and particularly on the ineffectiveness of T.F.G. president Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, and has the aim of advocating the abandonment of the T.F.G. by stakeholders and their adoption of a decentralizing strategy. As is often the case, a major think tank has expressed the policy shift of (Western great-power) actors – in this case, an extension of Washington’s  “dual-track” policy toward Somalia, which, closed sources report, is being followed by the Europeans. The I.C.G. report backs up the policy shift by discrediting the T.F.G. and Sh. Sharif, opening the way to stakeholders dealing directly with regional and local political organizations. Yet the authors of the report are aware that unmanaged decentralization that hyper-Balkanizes Somali territories would create dangerous instability for stakeholders. Therefore the I.C.G. wants somehow to hold on to “Somalia.”

The present analysis is not concerned with the I.C.G.’s discrediting of Sh. Sharif, which provides rhetorical ammunition for players who wish to use it. The analysis is concerned with the I.C.G.’s proposal for managing decentralization, to the extent of showing its utopian character and, therefore, revealing it as a thought of desperation. The analysis is concentrated on the I.C.G.’s diagnosis of “Somalia’s” political situation of fragmentation, which it defines accurately.

Somalia: “A Huge Revolt Against  the Centre”

In section I C. of the report, which faults the T.F.G. for “Refusing to Share Power or Federalise,” the I.C.G. goes to the heart of present “Somalia’s” political dynamics: “Because the current T.F.G. has failed to lead the devolution process and is too hamstrung to make any move in that direction any time soon, impatient communities in the periphery have began [sic.] organizing and creating their own local administrations. In effect what we are witnessing all over Somalia is a huge revolt against the centre – a chaotic, unilateral, clan-driven process.” The writer of this section of the draft concludes: “To let the periphery take charge of the devolution process, as has happened, is a recipe for further chaos and instability.” That sentence has been highlighted in the draft and a marginal comment made by EJH (presumably E.J. Hogendoorn): “Do you want to take the argument this far? If so, you need to convince me.” Hogendoorn’s style is to hedge his bets, to play it safe, not to get ahead of the major external (Western) political actors. Yet if there is a “huge revolt against the centre,” the conclusion follows.

When the I.C.G.’s report appears, we will find out whether or not Hogendoorn was “convinced.” At present it is enough to say that the revolt against the center is in full swing. Indeed, the most important event in Somalia thusfar during 2011 has been the issuance on January 16 by Puntland of its “New Position Towards the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia,” in which the semi-autonomous authority announced that it would not cooperate with the T.F.G. until a representative federal government is established in Somalia and is agreed on by legitimate stakeholders. It is just this kind of move –unmanaged devolution – that the I.C.G. fears.

Indeed, when Michael Onyiego of Voice of America interviewed Hogendoorn after Puntalnd’s announcement, Hogendoorn attempted to downplay the shift. He called the “new position” a “shot across the bow, saying that if you do not start giving us more political consideration or more resources, we can go our own way.” Although Hodendoorn admitted that Puntland’s secession from Somalia “is certainly a possibility,” he did not think it likely – he suggested that one look at Somaliland: “Why go down that road?”

Hogendoorn’s reluctance to draw the obvious conclusions from the I.C.G.’s draft report’s revolt-against-the-center thesis – that Puntland’s “new position” is a manifestation of the more general “revolt” – is reflected in the draft by the fact that its section on Puntland’s relation to the T.F.G.’s “refusing to federalise” had not yet been written; in its place was an editorial directive to insert a paragraph on why Sh. Sharif’s  “relations with Puntland are at an all time low” and to cite “reports Farole threatens to withdraw from T.F.G. Garowe Online?” Events overtook the draft, which was dated December 2010, when Puntland declared its new position. Puntland is always an embarrassment to the I.C.G.

We shall see what the I.C.G. does with Puntland this time around. For the moment, one can indulge oneself by writing the missing section: Puntland’s new position in light of the revolt-against-the-center thesis.

Puntland’s New Position

Puntland’s announcement of non-cooperation with the T.F.G. is a clear case of the revolt against the center, indeed the clearest case of the phenomenon that can be noted – Puntland, as the writer of section I C. puts it, is a prime example of an “impatient community.”

Puntland’s announcement of non-cooperation with the T.F.G. shows why the revolt is taking place – the T.F.G. as representative of the “center” has not performed its role. That is not to say, as the I.C.G. argues, that the T.F.G. has failed to bring Somalia’s regions together; failure means that there was a possibility to succeed given the balance of power and conflicting interests among the “stakeholders”/players – we cannot know that this was the case and there is even reason to judge that it was not. It is enough to say that the T.F.G. would not or could not perform a unifying role; indeed, it has proven incapable to unifying itself.

What is clear is that Puntland finally became “impatient” enough to make a break with the T.F.G. as representative of the center, if not with “Somalia” as an idea to be realized. Most of Puntland’s statement of its “new position” is taken up with explaining/justifying its break – Puntland has not participated in drafting a consitution meant to replace the T.F.G., it did not participate in the 2008-9 Djibouti Peace Process that set up the present expanded T.F.G., the T.F.G. did not honor its August 2009 agreement with Puntland defining relations among the two entities, and the T.F.G. attempted to monopolize donor military and development aid.

Puntland’s announcement of non-cooperation is simply the culmination of a series of slights – its patience finally ran out under circumstances favorable to a break: the announcement of Washington’s “dual-track” policy, which opens the way for Puntland to receive donor aid directly; and the scheduled expiration of the T.F.G.’s mandate in August 2011 and its replacement by a permanent government (which is by no means assured, but which might disadvantage Puntland’s perceived interests). That is, Puntland had incentives and reasons to make the break at this time. One must ask E.J., if we insert an editorial note to him: How can you say that Puntland’s new position is tactical and rhetorical, rather than strategic and serious?

Puntland’s move is to detach itself from the T.F.G. and its fate, whether that fate is extension of its term by the donors (through the United Nations) or the establishment of a permanent constitution. Puntland’s new position rejects term extension unequivocally and substitutes for the draft constitution being considered by the T.F.G. a national reconciliation conference to be hosted by Puntland that would presumably institute a “federalist” political formula favored by Puntland. Such a conference would throw “Somalia’s” political future open. That it is likely to take place is another question. What is clear is a revolt against the center.

Puntland’s “shot across the bow” is its call to the West/U.N. not to treat the T.F.G. as Puntland’s representative, but to deal with the latter separately. The donors (and the I.C.G.) must be asked: What are you willing to do [donors]/recommend [I.C.G]  to bring Puntland into some “manageable” process? What kind of process do you have in mind for “centering” decentralization if the periphery peels away from the T.F.G.?

There is a vacuum opening up – an absence of any representative of “Somalia,” any point of reference for external actors. How will the process of transition be managed? Does Hogendoorn have to be “Convinced” that “Chaos” is afoot? Why does the IC.G. place the emphasis so much on blaming the T.F.G. and Sh. Sharif, while ignoring the gross irresponsibility of the Western great powers (donors)? (That is simply to indulge in a rhetorical question.)

Puntland’s new position is not a “shot across the bow,” a provocation, a warning; it is a challenge. It poses the fundamental practical question: What political formula(e) will the territories of “Somalia” have? Of course, the Islamists – al-Shabaab – have an answer. The donors/powers (and the I.C.G.) do not.

Indeed, the best that the I.C.G.’s draft report can do is a brief final statement suggesting “a much more decentralized system, where most of the power, and resources are devolved to local administrations (preferably multi-clan) while the federal government only performs minimal functions and acts more to coordinate the activities of the different local administrations.” An editorial note asks: “Do we want to talk about a strategy for defeating Shabaab?” One can understand why the I.C.G. might want to leave discussion of al-Shabaab out of the text. One can ask: How does the I.C.G. propose that a (con)federal government be set up? Will it adopt the Puntland plan?

One can understand why an editorial note has been inserted in the concluding section advocating a “much more decentralized system”: “Discuss how this should be done – Jo Morrison’s project. E.J. will write the first draft.” Good luck, Jo Morrison.

Aftermath of Puntland’s New Position

Puntland’s minister for planning and international cooperation, Daud Mohamed Omar, who has taken the role for the administration of explaining and defending the policy shift, explained the move on January 16 as a response to Sh. Sharif’s “interference” with a donor meeting in Djibout, in which the T.F.G.’s president attempted to marginalize Puntland. According to Omar, Sh. Sharif has been troubled by Puntland’s increasing access to donors following the May 2010 Istanbul Conference – Sh. Sharif’s attitude, Omar said, was the straw that broke the camel’s back.

As speculation mounted about the import of the new position, Omar clarified the administration’s position in a January 18 interview with the B.B.C. Somali Service in which he said that the “international community” had been informed in advance of the shift, but that there had been only “minimal contact” with the T.F.G. He underscored that Puntland was not contemplating secession and reasserted the administration’s proposal for a national reconciliation conference hosted by Puntland. The stage was set for the response by the T.F.G. and the Western great-power donors.

The T.F.G. weighed in first, on January 19, through its prime minister, Mohamed Farmajo, who said that his government would open talks with Puntland in which “we can easily sort out what has really forced them to be a free state.” Farmajo expressed confidence that Puntland would revoke its decision and “reunite” with the T.F.G., and then proceeded to attack that decision, rather than conceding anything to Puntland. Saying that the “sudden decision” (which as has been shown was anything but that) would demoralize the Puntland population, could give “moral support” to al-Shabaab, and could hinder the T.F.G.’s efforts to bring peace to Somalia, Farmajo warned that the Puntland population “will not be pleased to hear their officials declaring separation from the rest of Somalia.” (Of course, Puntland did not declare separation from Somalia, but from the T.F.G.).

Puntland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamud Farole, was quick to rejoin that Puntland would “never negotiate” with the T.F.G., having “completely disconnected relations and agreements” with it. Farole advised Farmajo to stay in his own “limited area.”

The great-power Western donors entered the picture on January 20, when Farole traveled to Djibouti at the invitation of the U.N. Political Office for Somalia (U.N.P.O.S.) and met with the U.N.’s special representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga; and French diplomats and, most importantly, U.S. diplomats. Mahiga expressed the “shared concerns of the international community” about the rift between Puntland and the T.F.G., attempting to assuage Puntland by calling it a “role model” for Somalia and assuring that it has a “legitimate role to play in building consensus” on the actions regarding the T.F.G.’s mandate expiration. Farole discussed anti-piracy activities and development projects with the French. He addressed the major issue of non-cooperation with the T.F.G. in his meeting with Washington’s ambassador to Djibout, James Swan, justifying to Swan and Chryl Sims, Somalia affairs officer at the U.S. embassy in Kenya, Puntland’s opposition to term extension for the T.F.G. and pressing for a share of donor resources for training security forces. Farole also justified to Swan and Sims Puntland’s earlier decision to allow a non-Western donor state (according to a closed source the United Arab Emirates) to fund the training of a Puntland marine force by the private security firm Saracen International, which had caused concern in Washington. The latter’s response has not been reported.

On January 22, with Farole having returned to Puntland from Djibouti, the administration announced that it had banned T.F.G. officials, civil servants, and members of parliament from entering Puntland, and had ordered all government departments to enforce the order, “including airports.” On the same day, Farole announced that he had submitted a letter of complaint against the T.F.G.’s failure to honor agreements with Puntland to countries “involved in Somali affairs,” particularly the U.S., Japan, France, and the African Union. He vowed that Puntland would be involved in the “formation of a new Somali government. It appears that Western/U.N. efforts to bring Puntland back on the T.F.G. ranch had at least temporarily failed. Has the T.F.G. or any “permanent” government growing out of its process any standing, viability or sense in the absence of Puntland? 

At present, it appears that Puntland’s break with the T.F.G. is strategic rather than tactical. The unmanaged process of devolution has reached a further and deeper phase, and external powers seem to lack the will and, perhaps, the ability to resist it.

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Report Drafted By:   Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago   weinstem@purdue.edu

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