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Somalia: The Present Strategic Military Balance in Mogadishu [Intelligence Brief]
31 May 31, 2010 - 1:37:16 PM
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By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
A closed source provides intelligence, information, and strategic analysis on the present balance of military forces in Mogadishu. The source concludes that the successful offensive of the Islamist revolutionary group Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujihideen (H.S.M.) in the northern districts of Bondhere and Shibis on May 21 gave them an important strategic advantage and consequently weakened the position of their adversaries – Somalia’s internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), the African Union peacekeeping force (AMISOM) on which the T.F.G. is dependent for its existence, and the international coalition providing inadequate financial and diplomatic support to the T.F.G., and restricting AMISOM’s mandate. The source’s assessment of the new balance of forces leads to the possibility that the international coalition’s hand will be forced.
1.
The Military Balance Shifts
The source reports that H.S.M.’s May 21 offensive gave them the “commanding hill” in the north of Mogadishu, allowing them to overlook the entire northern area of the city, including the seaport. As a result, H.S.M. is now in the position to shell the seaport and render it inoperable.
Comment. The increased threat to the seaport, which is the major conduit for military equipment and supplies for the T.F.G. and AMISOM, and sustains Mogadishu’s economic life, shifts the military balance between H.S.M. and its opponents in the former’s favor; it gives H.S.M. a new card to play. Shelling the seaport to cripple its operations would have the cost for H.S.M. of losing popular and business support; yet it would cut the supply line of its military opposition. In addition, just the possibility that a punishing shelling might be executed in an act of bravado or desperation makes H.S.M. less easy to attack – it is like the North Korean artillery on the South Korean border, a deterrent. Indeed, on May 21, H.S.M. did not only capture territory; it attempted to shell ships in the port carrying weapons and ammunition destined for AMISOM.
2.
The Response to H.S.M.’s Offensive
H.S.M.’s May 21 offensive routed T.F.G. forces and came to within one-half kilometer of the presidential palace. The collapse of the T.F.G. defenses forced AMISOM armor into the streets to push H.S.M. back and fulfill its limited United Nations mandate to protect key T.F.G. installations and personnel. The source reports that AMISOM confined its response to driving its armor up the main road north and then returning to its defensive positions – a show of force. Restriction of its response to a show of force, the source says, is based on AMISOM’s fear that if its forces leave the main roads and venture into the streets, they will face H.S.M.’s fighters firing rocket-propelled grenades at their armor from behind.
3. Morale
Reflecting on the result of the success of H.S.M.’s May 21 offensive, the source provides intelligence that morale has been falling among the forces opposed to H.S.M. The morale of the Burundian contingent in AMISOM is particularly low and the source reports a widespread judgment that Burundian troops are selling their arms to Hizbul Islam (H.I.), the other major Islamist revolutionary group opposing the T.F.G., AMISOM and the international coalition. Ugandan troops, who are the other component of AMISOM, have reached the conclusion that they will not be able to partner successfully with T.F.G. forces and that the long promised T.F.G. offensive against H.S.M. will not be mounted. As a result the Ugandan troops and officers feel abandoned by the Ugandan government and chafe under the restrictions of their narrow mandate.
The T.F.G.’s forces also suffer from morale problems. The source says that despite claims that the T.F.G. has thousands of troops, it has, in reality, 1200 active forces, drawn from clan-warlord militias, who are not eager to engage with H.S.M.
Reluctance to fight on the part of its forces, says the source, has cancelled the T.F.G.’s advantage of having received more than 500 tons of weapons from Washington, rather than the 40 tons that has been officially announced. On the other side of the balance, the source says that contributions to H.S.M. from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have fallen from $5 million per month to $3 million, putting a crimp in the operational capacity of H.S.M. and allied foreign fighters from Pakistan.
Comment. On balance, the strategic position of the coalition opposed to H.S.M. is deteriorating. On May 26, T.F.G. forces backed by AMISOM launched a counter-offensive aimed at H.S.M. bases in Shibis and were repulsed. The source believes that the T.F.G. will not be able to retake the territory that it lost on May 21.
Should H.S.M. play its card and shell the seaport, that would force the hand of the donor-military powers in the international coalition – Washington and Western European states. They would either have to cede southern and central Somalia to H.S.M., or expand AMISOM’s mandate or intervene directly themselves. In the short run, a punishing shelling by H.S.M. is not likely; its likelihood would rise if H.S.M. either perceived that it was embattled, or felt confident that it was close to victory over its opponents and that they had lost their resolve to resist.
At present, says the source, the donor-military powers have doubled down on their rhetorical effort “to keep the T.F.G. myth going.”
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
©2010 All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this article for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Rebublication or redistribution of this report, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Garowe Online
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