|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Last Updated: Apr 3, 2012 - 2:47:55 AM |
|
|
|
 |
 |
|
|
|
Somalia: The “Transition” Continues to Drift
5 Jul 5, 2011 - 1:24:40 PM
|
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The signing of the Kampala Accord on June 9 brought to an end the first phase of the attempt(s) to control “Somalia’s” “transition” to a permanent government that began in January, 2011. It is worth noting that no steps towards implementing a “transition” have been made yet; all the energies and activities of the various players have been devoted to fighting over who would take over the “transition.” That condition has persisted in the weeks following the signing of the Kampala Accord.
“Transition”: Round One
The struggle over control of what has turned out to be an interminable “transitional process” was initiated in January by the Western great powers working through the U.N.
The “donor”-powers give the Transitional Federal Institutions (T.F.I.s) that represent “Somalia” internationally their mandates, provide them with their finances, and train their armed forces. They had mandated that the T.F.I.s would be dissolved in August, 2011 to be replaced by a permanent constitutional government. By the beginning of 2011, there had been no progress on that score, and the great powers decided that they had to act, since the T.F.I.s would not do so.
The point man for the “donor”-powers was and remains U.N. special representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, who is also the head of the U.N. Political Office for Somalia (U.N.P.O.S.), which functions as the “donor”-powers’ projection into Somalia’s domestic politics.
In early February, Mahiga unveiled the “donor”-powers’ plan for a “transition” by August. The T.F.I.s would be reformed and there would be a major conference of external and domestic actors in Nairobi to work out the set-up. Mahiga underscored that, if nothing else, the T.F.I.s would be dissolved in August.
Mahiga’s initiative met with immediate resistance. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.), the sub-regional organization of Somalia and its Horn of Africa neighbors, took the position that, in order to prevent a “power vacuum” in August, the term of the Transitional Federal Parliament (T.F.P.) should be extended. Having gained the cover of I.G.A.D., the T.F.P. voted to extend its term for three years without consulting with the U.N. The executive branch of the T.F.I.s, the Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), was left isolated by the T.F.P.’s plan, which envisioned presidential elections in August; the T.F.G. reacted by a counter-move, declaring a one-year term extension for all the T.F.I.s. From then on, the “transitional process” fell into disputatious drift, with the “donor”-powers/U.N., the T.F.G. (President Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad and Prime Minister Mohamed Farmajo), and the T.F.P. faction led by Speaker Sharif Hassan Sh. Adan squaring off in a deadlocked confrontation over the term-extension issue.
As the months of frenzied stasis and endless meetings and maneuverings went on, the “donor”-powers surrendered more and more of their original plan, until, by June, none of it was left and they had no policy. At that point, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, whose country’s military forces, along with Burundi, protect the T.F.I.s through an African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), stepped in and imposed a deal on the T.F.G. and T.F.P. (the Kampala Accord) that called for a one-year term extension for both. Sh. Sharif and Sharif Hassan signed the agreement, Museveni “guaranteed” it, and Mahiga witnessed it.
Museveni was able to put an end to the “donor”-powers/U.N.’s original initiative because the latter had not been willing to use their power to advance their plan against resistance; they gave orders to the T.F.I.s but would not enforce them and intervene to take responsibility for/control of the “transition,” which they had the ability to do. Realizing that the “donor”-powers would not act decisively – would not play the high cards in their hand – Museveni played his trump card, threatening to pull Uganda out of AMISOM if the one-year term extension was not endorsed. Since the “donor”-powers were unwilling to pull the financial and diplomatic plugs on the T.F.I.s, or at least credibly threaten to do so, they had to cave-in to Museveni, who was unwilling to be left hung out to dry in Mogadishu if a power vacuum opened up in August.
In order to understand what has happened to the “transition” in the month following the signing of the Kampala Accord, it is necessary to keep in mind that the first phase of the attempt to control the “transitional process” ended in the unmitigated failure, indeed disgrace, of the “donor”-powers/U.N. They held the legal (the T.F.I.s are their creatures), financial and military-support cards, yet their one key demand – that the “transition” end in August – was not met. Will they ever play their cards? Will they ever take responsibility? If they do not, frenetic drift will continue, because no other player has the power to take their place, except temporarily, as Museveni did. Each player other than the “donor”-powers is constrained to position itself in relation to what the latter might decide to do or fail to decide to do. In street language, the “donor”-powers started something that they would not finish. The question for all the other players is: Will the “donor”-powers change? Will they stop defaulting on their power-responsibility?
“Responsibility” in this case does not mean “moral responsibility,” but acknowledgment by the “donor”-powers that the other actors, by virtue of the distribution of power, are forced to calculated their positions in terms of the “donor”-powers; and a willingness to take the lead initiative and fight at their weight, rather than below it, for whatever interests they decide to pursue. Otherwise drift is inevitable, unless the “donor”-powers simply get out of Somalia. Their interests in containing Islamist “terrorism” and “piracy” prevent the latter, according to the way they understand the requisites of pursuing those interests.
Round Two Begins
The Kampala Accord was meant to resolve the dispute between Sh. Sharif and Sharif Hassan over term extension so that the “transition” – deferred for a year from August, 2011 – could proceed. The agreement had two major parts.
The first was a “power-sharing” deal between Sh. Sharif and Sharif Hassan that involved the dismissal of Prime Minister Farmajo, an ally of the president, so that a new government could be formed that would include in its cabinet members of both the president’s and speaker’s factions. According to a closed source in the Horn of Africa, Museveni told Sharif Hassan that he could have one demand met and no more, and that he chose to insist on Farmajo’s removal and a new government.
The second part of the Kampala Accord was a list of directives given by the “donor”-powers/U.N. to guide the “transition” to a conclusion in August, 2012, most importantly the drafting of a permanent constitution. The first step in that process would be a “consultative conference” of Somali stakeholders to be held in Somalia and sponsored by U.N.P.O.S. In essence the “donor”-powers/U.N. were reviving a version of the design that Mahiga had presented in February, 2011. The conditions were set for a second round of the fight to control the “transition.” It was as though the “donor”-powers/U.N. had learned nothing from their first attempt to control the “transition,” which had wasted half a year and had ended in abject failure.
Having handed responsibility for resolving the term-extension issue to Museveni, the “donor”-powers watched as the Kampala Accord that he had engineered began to unravel in the days following June 9.
Although Museveni had managed to twist Farmajo’s arm to acquiesce in stepping down as prime minister, he did not take account of popular and military support for the prime minister, who had improved conditions in Mogadishu and had paid the salaries of the security forces; and of a faction in the T.F.P. numbering approximately 150 (out of 550) M.P.s that was not allied with the president or the speaker, and that demanded that the Kampala Accord be approved by parliament. Large street demonstrations in favor of Farmajo’s retention and against the Kampala Accord immediately erupted in Mogadishu and in centers of the Somali Diaspora.
By June 12, the T.F.G.’s cabinet issued a statement in which it rejected its dissolution and insisted that “the Kampala Accord must be sent to the parliament for endorsement.” On June 13, the independent parliamentary faction, speaking through the chairman of the T.F.P.’s information committed, Awad Ahmed Ashara, gave its support to the cabinet’s position, demanding that Sharif Hassan convene parliament, blaming the Kampala Accord for the demonstrations, and accusing the president and speaker of being “traitors.” The independent faction called on Farmajo to submit the Kamapala Accord to parliament and criticized the agreement for provisions that deprived parliament of oversight of the T.F.I.s, prohibited votes of confidence on the president and speaker, and limited press criticism of the T.F.I.s.
Ashara added that the Accord had given a boost to the armed Islamist movement al-Shabaab that opposes the T.F.G. by providing the former with an opportunity to gain popular support. On June 14, Farmajo announced: “I will not leave when the Somali parliament has not approved the agreement. I will not resign at this time when I see the support I am getting from the Somali population.”
It had become obvious that Museveni had miscalculated and either did not understand the political forces at work in the T.F.I.s, overestimated his power, or simply did not assess the situation in his rush to impose a “solution” to the term-extension debate.
On June 15, the push-back against the Kampala Accord and Farmajo’s dismissal intensified with Farmajo meeting with more than 100 M.P.s to discuss the Kampala Accord and cooperation between the government and parliament. On June 16, the independent parliamentarians endorsed Farmajo’s decision to remain in office pending parliament’s decision on the Kampala Accord.
With the momentum on the side of Farmajo and the independent parliamentarians, Mahiga told BBC on June 17 that he had contacted Farmajo, but that the prime minister had refused to talk about any “political” matters, including the conflict over his resignation. Somalia Report said that the international actors had been holding “behind-the-scenes negotiations” with Somali factions to determine whether Farmajo might be retained “in some capacity” in a new government.
On June 18, Sh. Sharif met with a group of “professionals” in Mogadishu and asked them not to support “unnecessary demonstrations” and to back the Kampala Accord. Hiiraan Online reported that some of the “professionals” rebuffed Sh. Sharif and voiced their support of Farmajo.
On June 19, the first phase of the second round of the “transition” fight came to an abrupt end when Farmajo resigned as prime minister and Sh. Sharif named Abdiweli Mohamed Ali (Gas) as interim prime minister. Local and regional media reported that Museveni once again had played his trump card of threatening to withdraw Uganadan forces from Mogadishu if Farmajo failed to abide by the Kampala Accord. Having made good on his promise to Sharif Hassan to remove Farmajo, Museveni had accomplished nothing else, and the T.F.I. games continued.
On June 19, the independent M.P.s held a meeting at the parliament house in the absence of the speaker and demanded that sessions be convened to discuss the Kampala Accord. The independent faction threatened to continue to meet without the speaker if he did not open parliament.
Round Two Continues
The removal of Farmajo opened the way to a new conflict between Sh. Sharif and Sharif Hassan over who the new prime minister would be. Press TV reported that the two Sharifs had met on June 20 and had failed to agree on a candidate, with Sh. Sharif pushing for interim prime minister, Gas, a friend and ally of Farmajo from the Somali Diaspora in the U.S., and Sharif Hassan for Abidrizak Omar Hassan Jurile. Hiiraan online reported that Sharif Hassan had left the meeting “in a rage.” On June 21, the independent parliamentarians continued to press their demands for “urgent” sessions of parliament to be held to discuss the Kamapala Accord. The M.P.s’ rhetoric became more confrontational with Mohamed Abdi Yusuf declaring that the Accord subjected Somalia to a “trusteeship,” and Abdirashid Sh. Said saying that the deal was “utterly against the sovereignty of the nation.”
On June 23, Sh. Sharif named Gas as prime minister and Sharif Hassan said: “I also agree with his nomination.” Gas said that he would continue the policies of the Farmajo government. The appointment of Gas was a defeat for Sharif Hassan, who had been sidelined after his wish for Farmajo’s removal had been granted. Instead of gaining leverage for his allies in the new government, Sharif Hassan was forced to accept a prime minister who was no more favorable to his interests than Farmajo had been. In the following days, Sh. Sharif pressed his advantage against Sharif Hassan, insisting that Gas name a cabinet with which he could work “easily.” Somalia Report cited parliamentary sources who said that Sharif Hassan was pressing for an expansion of the cabinet and a splitting of ministries in order to make room for his allies.
On June 28, parliament was convened and voted 437-4-2 to approve Gas as prime minister. The overwhelming endorsement reflected the support of Sh. Sharif’s bloc, the satisfaction of the independent parliamentarians with the continuation of Farmajo’s policies and approach, and the acquiescence of Sharif Hassan, who, at least temporarily, found it imprudent to fight. He would have another chance to do so when Gas’s cabinet appointments came up to parliament for approval.
On July 2, Gas told BBC that he would set up an “efficient” cabinet with a small number of ministers. The Puntlandpost website reported that Sharif Hassan had agreed to give Gas “greater autonomy in the appointment of the new cabinet.”
On July 3, RBC Radio reported that Gas had been facing cross-pressures from Sh. Sharif and Sharif Hassan over the make-up of his cabinet. An anonymous Somali official said: “The speaker wants his supporters to be included [among] the nominees at the same time the president wants his colleagues to be included, and it is not easy to accept.” An RBC source said that Sharif Hassan was holding out for half of the cabinet posts to be filled by his supporters.
Added pressure came from Puntland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, who, as reported by Garoweonline on July 2, said that he did not “expect the T.F.G. to stab us in the back” on the cabinet list: “Puntland ministers should be appointed in consultation with us. An official claiming to represent Puntland can’t be an enemy of Puntland.” Shabelle Media reported that Farole would not accept “low-key” ministerial posts for Puntland in the new cabinet.
What would happen to Gas’s plan for a small efficient cabinet? He had run up against the fundamental tension between efficiency and broad representation, both of which the “donor”-powers/U.N. ingenuously insist on.
As the struggle over the new government unfolded and Sharif Hassan was outmaneuvered, the independent parliamentary bloc continued its pressure, preparing motions to reject the Kampala Accord and to oust Sharif Hassan. On July 3, Sh. Sharif and Gas met to discuss how the Kampala Accord might be approved by parliament.
Having been disgraced by their failure to control and direct the “transition,” the “donor”-powers/U.N. re-entered the play on their own track on June 20, when the “preparatory committee” for the projected “consultative conference” on the “transition” met in Nairobi. Made up of representatives from the T.F.G., T.F.P., Puntland, the Galmudug administration, the A.U., I.G.A.D., and the U.N., the committee decided, according to a statement released by U.N.P.O.S., that the conference would have the purpose of formulating a “roadmap to end the transition” that would include the key “transitional tasks” of finalizing and adopting a new constitution, restoring security and building national security institutions, fostering outreach and reconciliation among Somali factions, delivering basic administrative and social services, improving financial accountability, and preparing for a constitutional referendum and national elections – the same requirements that the “donor”-powers/U.N. had been urging/demanding with no results throughout 2011.. In addition to repeating the “donor”-powers/U.N.’s wish list, the preparatory committee said that the consultative conference would be attended by a “broad range” of Somali “stakeholders” and that “it must be as inclusive as possible.” The date and location of the conference, and the number of participants would be determined later on the basis of “ongoing security assessments.”
On June 24, the U.N. Security Council issued a non-binding presidential statement in which it “welcomed” the consultative conference, which it said should agree on a roadmap of key tasks and priorities for the next twelve months “with clear timelines and benchmarks” to be implemented by the T.F.I.s. On June 25, the U.S., through its embassy in Nairobi, followed up, specifically by urging the T.F.G. “to hold more consistent consultations with the Somali regions [Puntland and Galmudug], Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama’a [the armed Sufi movement], and the broader civil society.” On June 27, Great Britain, through its senior representative for Somalia, Matt Baugh, added the warning that failure to deliver on the “key [transitional] requirements could jeopardize U.K. and international support” for the T.F.I.s “Donor”-power rhetoric heated up even further on July 3, when the E.U.’s head of delegation, Roberto Ridolfi, took the hardest line towards the T.F.I.s in the current round of struggle. Making the threat of the withdrawal of “donor”-power support for the T.F.I.s unequivocal, Ridolfi said: “We shall not continue to feed a government that is achieving nothing.” He added that an election, even held in an insecure environment, “is still better than nothing. We have [in the T.F.I.s] self-appointed people which makes it difficult to recognize their legitimacy.”
There remains the question of what the “donor”-powers would propose as a substitute for the T.F.I.s if they continued with their games. Since the “donor”-powers are unlikely to step in and take over the “transition” directly, and are too frightened to leave Somalia alone, they have the alternatives of letting the drift go on – as they have done – or of opting for the only other alternative, which is acknowledging a divided Somalia, dealing with its sub-units, and dispensing with the possibility of a central government. The downside of cantonized fragmentation, juridically and practically, is obvious, but what else would be left for the “donor”-powers?
The “donor”-powers were at their old game of attempting to manage the “transition” without taking the lead role or even taking a measure of concrete responsibility, but issuing directives and tentative threats. Round two was in full swing.
By the beginning of July, an U.N.P.O.S. delegation had visited Mogadishu, Galkayo (Galmudug), and Garowe (Puntland) scouting for sites for the consultative conference. The prospect that the conference might be held in Galkayo or Garowe, rather than in Mogadishu, was a club over the head of the T.F.I.s.
Conclusion
The stark lesson of the first six months on 2011 is that Somalia’s political fate rests on a distribution of power in which the “donor”-powers are predominant and preponderant. Whether they exercise that power or keep in potential and its use uncertain – as they have – the “donor”-powers are responsible for what happens in Somalia, whether or not they acknowledge that fact. It is time to stop blaming Somalis for their plight and it would be realistic for Somalis to stop doing so. It would be expected that the “donor”-powers would shift any blame to the Somalis. Acknowledging the distribution of power and its effects is the first step for Somalis to take in assuming some role in shaping their destiny. Everything comes back to and resolves into how the powerful use their power. The others need all their wits to hold their own.
©2011 All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this article for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Rebublication or redistribution of this report, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of
Garowe Online
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
