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| Last Updated: Apr 3, 2012 - 2:47:55 AM |
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Somalia: The Transition Settles into Drifting Conflict
19 May 19, 2011 - 11:12:26 AM
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By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
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From the last week of April through mid-May, the “transition” of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions (T.F.I.s) to a permanent constitutional order, which is supposed to take place by August, 2011 according to an international mandate, ground to a halt as the Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) and the Transitional Federal Parliament (T.F.P.) settled into a bitter power struggle over conflicting conceptions of how long and under what conditions their terms should be extended beyond August, and the Western “donor”-powers, which finance the T.F.I.s and attempt to exert influence on them through the United Nations, observed the fight from the sidelines after having failed in mid-April to control the “transition” and bring it to a conclusion.
It has now become starkly clear that nothing even barely approaching a permanent political arrangement for Somalia will be in place by August; another month has been lost and the “donor”-powers’ desire to at least begin a transitional process becomes less and less likely to be fulfilled. The unwillingness or inability of the “donor”-powers to take the initiative in a decisive way has allowed the T.F.I.s to fall out among themselves and to indulge their addiction to internecine conflict over preferment. Whether or not the present pattern will continue depends upon the “donor”-powers: Will they allow the T.F.I.s or part of them to exist beyond August? Will they pull the plug on the T.F.I.s? Will they attempt a serious takeover of the transition? At present, the “donor”-powers appear to have accepted a short-term and probably medium-term acquiescence in drift. That judgment is indicated by the “donor”-powers’ failure to take any substantive action at a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on Somalia on May 12.
Drifting Conflict
The power struggle between the T.F.I.s became entrenched on April 24, when the T.F.G.’s cabinet announced that it was postponing elections for the speaker of parliament and the country’s president that were slated to take place in August. The cabinet’s rationale for its action was that elections were “impossible” due to insecurity. Its move was a direct challenge to the T.F.P., which was contemplating a presidential election in parliament in August, and to the “donor”-powers, which were insisting on elections in August for both the speaker and president. From then on the timing of elections became the major issue of Somalia’s politics, at least within the circle of conflict composed by the T.F.I.s and the “donor”-powers.
Reaction to the cabinet’s announcement was immediate by the T.F.P. with M.P. Ismail Ahmed countering that the government only had the right to propose measures and that,therefore, its decision to postpone elections was “illegal.” The fight was on.
On April 25, parliamentary opposition to the T.F.G.’s decision to defer elections intensified and spilled over to the dispute within the T.F.I.s between the earlier actions of the T.F.P. to extend its term for three years and the T.F.G. to extend the terms of both of the T.F.I.s for one year. Awad Ahmed Ashara, chairman of the T.F.P.’s information committee, argued that the T.F.G.’s cabinet had failed to inform parliament of the justification for its term-extension decision, which it should have done according to law. The faction in the T.F.P. loyal to its speaker, Sharif Hassan Sh. Adan, met at the speaker’s house to form a response to the T.F.G.’s move to postpone elections, with Ashara affirming the T.F.P.’s three-year term extension as “unchangeable,” and reiterating its resolve to hold elections in August. On April 27, the Mareeg website reported that the Sharif Hassan faction had met again, this time at Mogadishu’s Salafi Hotel, to underscore its opposition to the postponement of the presidential election. Meanwhile, the website reported, Sharif Hassan had begun an intensive campaign among M.P.s to win support for an August presidential election in parliament and for his bid to win the post. On April 28, Shabelle Media Network reported that a group of M.P.s, led by former deputy speaker, Mohamed Omar Dalha, had begun efforts to mediate between the T.FP and T.F.G. on the election-timing dispute. On April 29, the T.F.G. announced that mediation was underway as the pro-speaker parliamentary faction and the pro-T.F.G. faction of M.P.s held separate meetings.
Threatened by the momentum building toward an August presidential election in parliament and Sharif Hassan’s positioning himself to win it, the T.F.G.’s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmed, who seeks to retain his post, went on the attack on April 30, charging that the Presidential Election Parliamentary Committee, which had been appointed by Sharif Hassan to set up the August election, was illegal on the grounds that “a potential presidential candidate [Sharif Hassan] cannot appoint members of a committee that is supposed to monitor and regulate presidential elections, this is totally illegal and illogical.” On the same day, Sh. Sharif met with the T.F.G.’s cabinet and parliamentary supporters, explaining that he was not opposed to elections, but that they could only be held after “consultations with stakeholders” on resolving the dispute over conflicting term-extension decisions by the T.F.I.s and “ending the transition.” Sh. Sharif added that decisions on term extension were the responsibility of the government and that parliament had not consulted with the government when the former had extended its term.
With the last week of April having been taken up with the T.F.G. and the T.F.P. (pro-speaker faction) maneuvering themselves into a stand-off over the timing of elections, May began with the third actor in the “transition,” the “donor”-powers/U.N., weighing in. On May 1, the European Union, which plays the greatest part in bankrolling the T.F.I.s, issued a statement that future support of the transitional institutions should be contingent on their making progress on “reform” and “the delivery of transitional tasks,” such as holding elections and drafting a permanent constitution. Expressing its “regret” over the T.F.P.’s term extension, the E.U.’s unprecedented threat to pull the plug on the T.F.I.s reflected the “donor”-powers’ frustration with the halt to momentum towards the completion of the “transition.” The E.U.’s statement was unclear about whether or not it would stop supporting the T.F.I.s if their present officeholders failed to step down in August, and a closed source in the Horn of Africa reported that the statement was intended to frighten the T.F.I.s rather than being a serious threat – the “donor”-powers did not want to face a political vacuum in which there would not be even a nominal “representative” of “Somalia.”
In response to the E.U.’s challenge, Sharif Hassan chaired a meeting of supportive M.P.s on May 4 to determine their position. The Raxanreeb website reported that the faction was satisfied with the E.U.’s statement, with M.P. Ibrahim Hassan Bule, a member of the T.F.P.’s electoral committee, saying at a press briefing that the pro-speaker group was in step with the E.U., making clear that it was preparing for an August presidential election that would be held in parliament, obviating the security concerns attending a public election.
Also on May 4, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report to the U.N. Security Council, in which he warned that the disagreement among the T.F.I.s over term extension was “distracting” them from performing the “transitional tasks,” most importantly advancing the constitution-making process. Ban did not follow the E.U. in threatening the withdrawal of aid if the T.F.I.s did not comply with “donor”-power desires, reflecting his need to balance interests of the “donor”-powers and regional African states, which were moving to support the T.F.G.’s one-year term extension for the T.F.I.s.
With a U.N.S.C. meeting on Somalia slated to take place in a week, on May 11 the T.F.P. acted quickly to put is plan for August elections in motion, with Bule announcing that the electoral committee had prepared documents and “electoral cards” for the presidential poll. The T.F.P. went on the attack against the T.F.G., with M.P. Ali Mahamoud Farah (Seko), speaking for parliament’s justice committee, warning Sudan and the United Arab Emirates not to give any aid funds to the T.F.G., a delegation of which led by Sh. Sharif was visiting those countries. The T.F.G., said Seko, was “destabilizing” Somalia by “interfering with elections.”
With the pro-speaker faction moving to implement its electoral program, the pro-T.F.G. parliamentary faction countered their opponents’ initiative. Speaking for the group on May 6, M.P. Abdikadir Shido accused the electoral committee and Sharif Hassan of “violating procedures” by deciding to hold a presidential election before an election for speaker, when the elections were supposed to proceed in the reverse order according to law. Shido said that the pro-T.F.G. faction would present a motion blocking the electoral committee’s actions at the next session of the T.F.P.
The conflict escalated on May 9, when 35 M.P.s representing the electoral committee, who were traveling to Nairobi to attend a U.N.-sponsored workshop on elections, were forcibly detained at Adan Adde Airport in Mogadishu by order of the T.F.G.’s interior ministry. The T.F.G. explained and justified its action on the grounds that the M.P.s did not clear their travel plans with the government. In addition, the T.F.G. restated its non-recognition of the electoral committee due to its appointment “by an individual [Sharif Hassan].” T.F.G. spokesman Abdirahman Omar Osman added that the T.F.G. was trying to “make a deal” with Sharif Hassan on term extension, suggesting the T.F.G.’s one-year extension for both T.F.I.s –rejected by the T.F.P. – as a solution.
The spokesperson for the electoral committee, M.P. Hareed Hassan Ali, shot back that the detentions were solely motivated by Sh. Sharif’s desire to stop the T.F.P.’s August presidential election. The election, he said, would go on despite the T.F.G.’s attempt to interfere in its preparation. Sharif Hassan said that the detained M.P.s were engaged in “lawful behavior” and demanded that the cabinet apologize for its charges that the M.P.s had broken the law.
Sh. Sharif hit back at Sharif Hassan at a meeting with the T.F.G.’s National Reconciliation Committee, at which he called the T.F.P.’s electoral committee an illegal “tragedy.” Sharif Hassan, said Sh. Sharif, “does not have the right to name the committee.” Nonetheless, Sh. Sharif asked the reconciliation committee to seek a solution to the conflict between the T.F.I.s, adding that no elections were possible until the dispute over term extensions was resolved. The chairman of the reconciliation committee, Ismail Moalim Muse, told Sh. Sharif that the committee was doing everything it could to heal the rift.
The electoral committee responded through Hassan Ali that a motion would be tabled in parliament to dismiss the interior and national security ministers. Pro-T.F.G. M.P.s applauded the detentions, charging that Sharif Hassan had been acting only in his own interest. On May 11, Sharif Hassan announced that the detained M.P.s had been cleared for travel to Nairobi. The Raxanreeb website reported that the release of the M.P.s was the result of mediation by a “neutral” group of M.P.s.
The detentions provided the U.S., which had relinquished leadership of the “donor”-powers after its failure in mid-April, due to T.F.G. non-cooperation, to manage the “transition” through the U.N., with the opportunity to express displeasure with the T.F.G. The detentions, said the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, were the latest in a pattern of the T.F.G. “stifling peaceful political discussion and silencing critics.” The Embassy then “reminded” the T.F.G. of its commitment to the U.N.S.C. to advance reconciliation and to complete the transition tasks, particularly constitution making.
As the conflict between the T.F.I.s ratcheted up, the T.F.G.’s prime minister, Mohamed Farmajo, was in New York for the U.N.S.C. meeting on Somalia, at which he would defend and attempt to persuade the “donor”-powers to endorse the T.F.G.’s one-year T.F.I. term extension.
Attempting to use the U.N.S.C. as a means to advance factional aims, Farmajo began his “update on political developments” by criticizing the T.F.P.’s three-year term extension as “hasty” and done “without consultation.” He then moved to a “question of more practical importance” – the “juridical relations” between the T.F.I.s. Under the principle of Simul Stabat Vel Simultcadent, Farmajo argued, all T.F.I.s cease to exist in August, 2011. Only a newly elected parliament, he continued, would have the legitimacy to hold presidential elections, and it is the “responsibility of the executive to coordinate efforts to achieve pre- and post-transition arrangements,” which the T.F.G. had been doing.
Having given his juridical analysis, Farmajo then stepped outside legal theory, presenting and pleading the T.F.G.’s case for one-year term extension. Arguing that although the T.F.G. had been making impressive advances against its armed Islamist opponents on the ground, the government needed a year to extend and consolidate those gains. The gains, he said, would be jeopardized by the “distraction of interminable election processes and the divisive campaigning that will inevitably take place.” In consequence, Farmajo said, the T.F.G. is proposing “to parliament and the international community” its one-year term extension policy.
As the putative representative of “Somalia,” Farmajo might have said many things; he chose to use his speech to prolong the T.F.I. fight. His case for the one-year term extension policy had little chance of being endorsed by the U.N.S.C. The speech was a staking of position, not an opening.
Faced with the consuming power struggle within the T.F.I.s, the U.N.-“donor”-power coalition was forced to divert its efforts to positioning itself in relation to the term-extension issue. The U.N. secretary-general’s representative to Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, who is reponsible for coordinating the coalition’s engagement in the “transition” and had been severely weakened in mid-April by his failure to persuade the T.F.G. to attend a U.N.-sponsored “consultative” conference in Nairobi, approached the U.N.S.C. meeting in a posture of desperation and pleading. In his speech to the Council, Mahiga “appealed” to the U.N.S.C. to “weigh in” on the term-extension issue; the “single most divisive” political issue, he said, was the “timing of elections.” Mahiga had no concrete solutions to offer for healing the rift between the T.F.G. and T.F.P.; he was waiting on the “donor”-powers, which, in the wake of the U.S. failure to take over the “transition,” had no leadership and no policy (except the aim of ending the “transition”).
With the U.S. still vexed at the T.F.G. over the latter’s boycott of the Nairobi conference and the E.U. unwilling/unable to fill the leadership gap, the U.N.S.C. was reduced to issuing a “presidential statement” that had no binding legal force and that simply “expressed concern at discord between the T.F.I.s and its impact on the political process and the security situation.” The statement expressed “regret” at the term extensions of the T.F.I.s, calling on them “to refrain from further unilateral actions” and to complete the transitional tasks. In its only assertive moment, the U.N.S.C. warned that there could be no extension of the T.F.I.s’ mandate if elections for president and speaker were not held. There was no mention of withdrawal of aid to the T.F.I.s if they did not make progress on transitional tasks (as the E.U. had tentatively threatened), and no harsh criticism of the T.F.G. (as the U.S. Embassy in Kenya had expressed). There was no hint that the “donor”-powers were willing to “weigh in” on the term-extension/election-timing dispute (as Mahiga had implored them to do), except to call for elections. The U.N.S.C. had chosen to let the drifting conflict go on, now having entirely abandoned any push to have a “transition” completed or in process by August, 20111, and having embraced the possibility of mandate extension for the T.F.I.s.
As the U.N.S.C. issued its toothless “presidential statement,” the fight continued in the T.F.I.s as though the U.N.-“donor”-power coalition did not exist. On May 11, the T.F.G. issued a statement that it had sent a work plan and an agenda for transitional tasks to the T.F.P., but that the legislature had not acted on them. The T.F.P. also had not taken action on agreements with Turkey, Sudan, and Indonesia that had been submitted to it, the T.F.G. claimed. On May 13, the T.F.P. responded with a statement from Sharif Hassan that parliament had not snubbed the letters from the government on agreements with other countries. A new “issue” had opened up.
A group of M.P.s led by deputy speaker Abdiweli Ibrahim Sh. Mudey met in Nairobi on May 14 and proposed that elections for speaker and president be held in August. The faction also expressed “dismay” that Sh. Sharif and Farmajo had refused to accept the T.F.P.’s three-year term extension of February, 2011 that it had originally endorsed, but was now denouncing at the U.N.
Having failed once again to get a purchase on the “transition,” this time by his inability to convince the “donor”-powers on the U.N.S.C. to “weigh in” on the term-extension/elections-timing issue, Mahiga issued a somber statement on May 14, in which he said that “the crux of the paralysis” in the T.F.I.s was the determination of the T.F.G. and the T.F.P. “not to change.” Reflecting the disarray of the external stakeholders, Mahiga said that he was attempting to get the U.NS.C., A.U., and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.) – the subregional organization of Horn of Africa states, which sides with the T.F.G. – to “heal the paralysis by agreeing on necessary benchmarks to end the transition.” The stakeholders, said Mahiga, needed to create “congenial conditions” for the T.F.I.s to reach “a consensus to hold the elections in August or to have them deferred.” Mahiga had reached the obvious conclusion that, since the T.F.I.s would not provide the “momentum” for the “transition,” the external actors would have to step in to give the push, if they could agree on what they wanted and how to get it.
The only immediate result of the U.N.S.C. presidential statement and Mahiga’s follow-up remarks was a statement by Sharif Hassan on May 16 in which he attempted to win the U.N.-“donor”-powers over to his faction’s position on the election issue. Hailing the U.N.S.C.’s call for elections, the speaker asked the U.N., A.U., I.G.A.D., and Somalia’s neighbors to assist in holding them according to the T.F.P.’s plan. Turning to the T.F.G., Sharif Hassan warned that if it did not accept the elections in parliament, “there will be rival presidents in the country.”
Assessment and Forecast
Mahiga’s telling statement that the T.F.I.s would somehow have to reach “a consensus to hold the elections in August or to have them deferred” marks the unraveling of the U.N.-“donor”-power attempt to effect a “transition” to a permanent political arrangement for “Somalia” that was initiated in February.
Drifting conflict is the order of the day and there are no signs of any “momentum” that would change that situation, at least in the short term. The external “stakeholders” are leaderless and in disarray, with no policy for the “transition,” and the T.F.I.s are involved in their interminable fights over preferment. Lacking cooperation from the T.F.I.s and with no support from the “donor”-powers, Mahiga is left having to attempt to carry out an impossible mission, as he as much as admits.
The projected termination of the mandate of the T.F.I.s in August, 2011 once looked like a milestone; now it looks like it will be just another bump in an endless road.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
©2011 All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this article for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Rebublication or redistribution of this report, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Garowe Online
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