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| Last Updated: Apr 3, 2012 - 2:47:55 AM |
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Somalia: Transition Games
5 Apr 5, 2011 - 3:18:08 PM
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By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Through the end of March and into April, the “transition” of Somalia’s internationally recognized Transitional Federal Institutions (T.F.I.s) to a permanent constitutional arrangement continued to be delayed and promised to be so for the foreseeable future.
The cause of the delay has been a power struggle over control of the transition and the direction that it should take, between the United States working through the United Nations, and the T.F.I.s (presidency, government, and parliament) supported by Ethiopia working through the sub-regional Horn of Africa organization the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.).
Under the current transitional arrangements worked out in Djibouti in 20009, the T.F.I.s are supposed to end in August, 2011 and a premanent political order to take its place. By the end of 2010, it became clear that that scenario would not occur, and a struggle among the interests involved in Somalia’s political future broke out over what would be done instead. The U.N.-U.S. initiated the conflict in early 2011 by proposing a plan presented by the U.N.’s special representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, in which the T.F.I.s would end in August, 2011 and that an alternative to them would be determined at a conference of domestic and external actors to be held in Nairobi. Immediately opposition to the U.N. plan surfaced in the T.F.I.s and I.G.A.D. with the latter countering the U.N. plan with one to extend the term of the Transitional Federal Parliament (T.F.P.) beyond August. Having received a green light from I.G.A.D., the T.F.P. voted to extend its term for three years, evoking opposition from the international coalition of donor powers (U.S., European Union, and European states). Holding fast to its decision, the T.F.P. was able to wear down opposition to it through early March to the point at which only the United States was determined to reverse the T.F.P.s term extension.
The picture changed when the U.S. pressed the U.N. to revive a scaled-down version of its original plan in which the T.F.I.s would end in August, a conference would be held in Nairobi on a future political arrangement for Somalia, and an interim government under an interim constitution would be set up to replace the T.F.I.s and finalize a permanent constitutional order by August, 2012. When the E.U. acquiesced in the U.N.-U.S. plan, the T.F.P. responded by rejecting it. The stage was set for a confrontation that erupted at the end of March and has diverted all of the actors in Somalia’s conflicts from making progress politically to political in-fighting.
The power struggle over the transition has followed the pattern of political conflict described by classical modern political history, most clearly by Arnold Toynbee, who broke the moments of conflict into a series of challenges and responses by adversaries. A paradigm case of challenge-response, the power struggle over the transition begins with the challenge initiated by the U.N., proceeds to the T.F.P.’s response-challenge, moves to the U.N.-U.S. response-challenge to the T.F.P, and has continued into another round, adding actors along the way.
Round Two of the Transition Fight
Although the U.N.-U.S. plan had not yet been made public, members of the T.F.P. had already become aware of it by the third week of March and immediately began a counter-offensive meant to derail the Nairobi conference. On March 23, twelve members of parliament led by Ali Mohamoud Farah Seeko and the chair of the parliament’s information committee, Awad Ahmed Ashara, held a news conference at which they attacked Mahiga, saying, as Seeko put it, that the U.N. special representative was planning to impose an “informal parliament” from his “pocket,” with the motive of getting money from donor powers. Speaking to the conferences inclusion of regional states and local administrations, Ashara charged that Mahiga was “lobbying” to “sub-divide” Somalia’s contentious fragments, calling on the external stakeholders – the United Nations Security Council, U.S., A.U., I.G.A.D., the Arab League, and “interested states” - to oppose Mahiga’s “conspiracy against Somali sovereignty.”
Parliamentary speaker, Sharif Hassan Sh. Adan, quickly moved to pre-empt the Nairobi conference by announcing that the T.F.P. would form a “nominating committee” to prepare for presidential elections by August. Sharif Hassan urged the “international community” to help the T.F.P. implement its version of the “transition.”
Sharif Hassan’s move had the consequence of engendering a severe split within the T.F.I.s when T.F.G. president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmed, issued a statement asserting that it was illegal for the T.F.P. to prepare new elections when the president’s term was still in effect. According to Sh. Sharif’s interpretation of the transitional charter, only a new parliament could elect a new president; otherwise a sitting president could only be replaced through death, resignation or dismissal.
The typical pattern of in-fighting in the T.F.I.s, in which “constitutional” issues are the cover for the struggle for preferment, was in full force, precipitated by the U.S.-U.N. plan. Sharif Hassan’s plan, made in response to the U.S.-U.N. design, would end Sh. Sharif’s tenure in August; Sh. Sharif’s interest was in having his term extended. Now there was a conflict between the U.S.-U.N. and the T.F.I.s, and a subsidiary and derived conflict within the T.F.I.s
By March 25, the T.F.P. factions were expressing their reactions to Sh.Sharif’s position, which the Seeko group branded illegal. On March 26, the deputy chair of the parliament’s committee on reconciliation, Mohamad Umar Mahamud, said that only parliament had the right to extend its term and that Sh. Sharif should respect the law. On the same day, Sh. Sharif met with members of the T.F.P.’s constitution committee, telling them to inform T.F.I. officials to keep within their constitutional limits. An official in the presidency told Alll Headline News that the constitution committee would attempt to resolve the differences between Sh. Sharif and Sharif Hassan. On March 27, M.P.s continued their attacks on Sh. Sharif. M.P. Gele Mahmoud called Sh. Sharif’s position illegal and his “personal view.”
Joining the attacks on the Nairobi conference, group of M.P.s led by former warlord and T.F.G. police commissioner, Mohamad Qanyare Afrah, announced that they would boycott the Nairobi conference, repeating the charge that Mahiga’s aims were to divide Somalia and get money from donors. Qanyare urged the “international community” to cancel the Nairobi conference and instead to hold one between the T.F.I.s and the armed Islamist opposition, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M), which controls much of southern and central Somalia.
Having simply responded to Sharif Hassan’s plan for elections by rejecting it, the T.F.G. decided to issue its own challenge on March 27, defying both Mahiga and Sharif Hassan by extending its term and that of the other T.F.I.s for a year to August, 2012. Announcing the move, constitution and federal affairs minister, Mohamed Mahumoud Boon, said that it had been done to give the government the time necessary to restore security, curb corruption, and resettle internally displaced persons, all of which, he said, were required to prepare the way for a successful transition.
On March 28, Sharif Hassan responded to the cabinet’s decision by rejecting it, insisting in a speech to the T.F.P. that no one could force parliament to review its decisions or withdraw them. Parliamentary resistance to the cabinet’s extension of its term continued on March 29, when Sh. Jama Haji Hussein, chair of the T.F.P.’s committee on constitutional and federal affairs, accused the T.F.G. of attempting to reverse the T.F.P.’s three-year term extension, adding that the T.F.P. had earlier requested a plan for the transition from the cabinet, but had received no response. Jama said that the T.F.P. would proceed with its plan for presidential elections in August.
As the T.F.P. and T.F.G. fell into factional wrangling, Mahiga quietly attempted to prepare for the Nairobi meeting by seeking support among stakeholders and visiting Somaliland (it rejected attending the Nairobi conference) and Puntland (it accepted Mahiga’s invitation, but continued its suspension of relations with the T.F.G., although it acknowledged that the “international community” was mediating between the two).
On March 29, Mahiga moved to enter the situation in public in an interview with the Associated Press opposing the cabinet’s term extension, saying that “the international community did not buy the argument of the government and, instead, wants to see elections in July.” Mahiga said that the “international community” (“donor” powers) were open to a one-year term extension for the T.F.I.s, but only under the conditions that a new government was in place in August and an “interim constitution” was put in place. When asked whether the donors would respond to noncompliance by the T.F.G. with their demands by the by pulling the plug on financial aid, Mahiga said, “We don’t want to paralyze these institutions. ... And really by removing the government partner who is supposed to provide leadership in the struggle against al-Shabaab [H.S.M.] you are literally spelling defeat to the whole exercise.” Here Mahiga signaled that the original plan for the Nairobi conference had been scaled back further, and that the T.F.I.s had gotten a foothold. The T.F.I.s, however, had displeased the donors, who had made it clear that the T.F.P.’s and T.F.G.’s actions on term extension “would not be accepted.”
Having outlined the position of the “international community” as implemented by the U.N., Mahiga swung into action, holding on March 30 meetings in Mogadishu with Sh. Sharif, T.F.G. prime minister, Mohamed Farmajo, and Sharif Hassan aimed at persuading them to attend the Nairobi conference. Mahiga said in a press conference that all the top officials of the T.F.I.s had accepted his invitations to the Nairobi conference, at which they would have the “opportunity” to discuss their relations with the regional states of Somalia. He urged the T.F.I.s to honor their mandate to end the transition in August, but did not discuss during his visit the power struggle between the T.F.P. and T.F.G., which would be broached at the Nairobi conference. Mahiga stressed that the Nairobi conference. Mahiga stressed that the Nairobi conference was “consultative” and that no decisions would be made at it.
Mahiga’s issuing of formal invitations to the Nairobi conference met with immediate, intensifed, and hardening opposition to his plan. Djibouti, representing I.G.A.D.’s and Ethiopia’s position, said through its minister for religious affairs, Hamoud Abdi Sultan, that the Nairobi conference would “rekindle conflict and civil war” in Somalia. The T.F.G., said Sultan, should be the “launching point” for the transition, not “another Somali national reconciliation conference” that would place Somali regional states on the same level as the T.F.I.s.
The T.F.G. acted quickly, its cabinet contradicting Mahiga’s statement that it would attend the Nairobi conference by voting unanimously to boycott it and issuing a statement “welcoming efforts by the international community to bring peace.” Speaking for the cabinet, deputy prime minister and defense minister, Abdikarim Fiqi, explained that the Nairobi meeting would be subversive of the progress that the T.F.G. was making and that the government was holding talks with clan elders, intellectuals and the general public on “the best way to peace.” In an interview with Agence France Presse, Farmajo announced the cabinet’s plan, which was to take a year to “finish the job of security” and then to draw up a draft constitution and law on political parties.
The T.F.P. acted just as quickly with Sharif Hassan saying that parliament would consider whether or not to attend the Nairobi conference, and then announcing the formation of the elction committee and two others, a parliamentary reform committee aimed at organizing the T.F.P. more effectively, and a strategic plan committee to formulate a political roadmap.
Sharif Hassan’s moves provoked a reaction within the T.F.P., when second deputy speaker, Ahmed Dhimbel, accused the speaker of acting illegally in forming the three committees. Calling Sharif Hassan a “dictator,” Dhimbil insisted that only the second deputy speaker is authorized to supervise the functions of parliamentary committees.
Meanwhile, the parliamentary factions opposing the Nairobi conference continued attacks on Mahiga’s plan, reiterating the criticisms that they had already made.
On April 1, Mahiga went public, with the U.N. Political Office for Somalia (U.N.P.O.S.), which is headed by the special representative, issuing a press release announcing that a “consultative meeting” would take place in Nairobi on April 12 and 13, at which Somali factions, including the T.F.G. and Somali regional states were to discuss the political future of Somalia. Mahiga said the announcement had been preceded by a meeting of U.N.P.O.S. with a “core group of regional and international partners and stakeholders.” The attempt of U.S.-U.N. to manage the transition was in play with the coalition of external actors interested in Somalia on board, reluctantly or not.
The attempt, however, had been hobbled by a week and a half of opposition to the U.S.-U.N. plan and the Nairobi conference, as they leaked out and factions mobilized against them. The bid by the U.S.-U.N. to manage the “transition” seemed to be doomed from the start.
Mahiga, indeed, could not even count on the participation of the T.F.I.s in the “High Level Consultative Meeting,” the cabinet having boycotted it and the speaker and parliament still undecided on attendance. Mahiga was reduced to urging the “Somali authorities” to participate. Mahiga was at pains to stress that the major purpose of the conference was to forge a “common vision” among Somali actors, and repeating his assurance that it was purely consultative – no decisions would be made. The “international community,” he went on, would be present only as observers to “show support” and to “get a clear idea” of the role the T.F.I.s in the “transition” with – and here the U.S.-U.N. scale back of its plans became evident – “the current framework based on the Transitional Federal Charter and the Djibouti agreement.” It appears that the plan to reformulate Somali political institutions had been shelved. Rather than taking over the “transition,” the U.S.-U.N. was left with its intention to revive the High Level Committee, chaired by Mahiga and the T.F.G., which serves as the formal access point of the coalition of external actors to the T.F.I.s.
In order even to hope to get attendance at the conference, Mahiga had been forced by the pressure of Somali actors, Horn of Africa powers, and some skeptical donors to deprive it of any force to change the status quo. In place of the U.S. demand for revocation of The T.F. I. term extensions and a new transitional arrangement had been substituted the quest for a “common vision” conducted within the “Transitional Federal Charter” (there is no mention of an “interim constitution” and the extant Djibouti agreement.
Despite the fact that the Nairobi conference (“High Level Consultative Meeting”) had been watered down to inanity, its official announcement set off a wave of opposition to it from domestic and external actors. The Hawiye clan elders group, The Tradition and Unity Council, cautioned T.F.I. leaders not to attend the meeting, which was a “plot against the Somali people,” and praised the T.F.P. for planning to hold presidential elections in Mogadishu. The Somali Religious Assembly denounced the Nairobi meeting as “a conspiracy against Somalia,” praised the cabinet’s boycotting of it, and advised Mahiga to invite H.S.M. to a conference. Through senior advisor to President Mohamed Silanyo, Mohammed Rashid, Somaliland announced that it had rejected Mahiga’s invitation to attend the Nairobi conference, even in observer status. Nathan Mugisha, the force commander of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which protects the T.F.I.s, said that “there is no other option, unfortunately, “ than to extend the T.F.G.’s mandate: AMISOM needed a “partner;” to “disrupt” the T.F.G. would “disempower” AMISOM, and would play into H.S.M.’s hands.
The announcement of the conference set off a split in the T.F.P., with a group numbering more than one- hundred M.P.s denouncing the meeting, backing the cabinet’s boycott of it, and criticizing Sharif Hassan for not coming out in favor of a boycott. Ashara advised Sharif Hassan to confine himself to “chairing debates” and accused him of “exercising excessive power.”
On April 3, Farmajo, in an interview with the T.F.G.’s Radio Mogadishu, reaffirmed the cabinet’s decision to boycott the Nairobi conference, taking a hard anti-foreign tone. The Somali people, he said, “will not accept being colonized” and the government “will not go to any country that will invite us.” On April 4, Farmajo held a press conference at which he challenged U.N.P.O.S. and Mahiga to relocate from Nairobi to Mogadishu within three months. Facilities had been prepared for U.N. agencies, said Farmajo, adding that “someone in Nairobi can know nothing about what is going on inside our country.” Farmajo insisted that his challenge had nothing to do with the issue of attending the Nairobi conference.
On April 5, Mahiga responded to Farmajo’s order to relocate to Mogadishu by saying that insecurity and the lack of adequate facilities prevented the move, adding that the U.N. maintained a presence in Somalia, although he admitted that “international” U.N. personnel are based mainly in Nairobi. Mahiga called Farmajo’s announcement “very ambitious.” He said that the Nairobi meeting would take place despite the T.F.G.’s boycott. Farmajo hit back immediately at a press conference mainly devoted to piracy, saying that the T.F.G. had not been consulted in advance on the Nairobi conference, and that the meeting was not in the interest of the Somali government and the Somali people.
The first demonstrations against the Nairobi conference and in support of the government’s boycott of it also took place on April 5, in Mogadishu (organized by the city government), Galkayo in the Mudug region, El-Berde in the Bakool region, and in the disputed Sool and Sanaag regions controlled by Somaliland.
Echoing Farmajo, who had adopted its rhetoric, on April 3 even H.S.M. got into the act with Sh. Hassan Dahir Aweys calling the U.N. “a new colonial organization” that was planning to “demoralize” Somalis and “destabilize the country.” H.S.M., said Aweys had “refused and refuses the Nairobi talks” and “would not accept their results.”
On April 5, one of the factions of the armed Sufi movement, Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jamaa, which is loosely allied with the T.F.G., controls parts of central Somalia, and is firmly opposed to H.S.M., accepted its invitation from Mahiga to attend the Nairobi conference.
Assessment
Round Two of the struggle by the U.S.-U.N. to manage the “transition” in Somalia to a “permanent government” has ended with it thrown on the ropes by a set of counter-attacks by the various disparate actors with perceived interests in keeping the T.F.I.s going or, like Somaliland, keeping out of the fight. The American Gulliver has succumbed to the Lilliputians.
What comes next is anyone’s guess and all depends on Washington’s next move. Will Washington finally give up on trying to (re-)direct the “transition” and join the rest of the players rather than attempting to change the game? Will Washington make yet another stab at fighting above its weight – trying to manage the “transition” when it either cannot (that is the likely case) or will not (a result of the “cannot”) do so?
All that Washington/Mahiga has been doing is stopping any possible “transition,” likely or not, dead in its tracks. Another month will be lost as August looms. Indeed, perhaps it has reached the point that it is too late for any structural changes to occur in August – all the time has been wasted on divisions among all the actors. If that is the case, then Washington will have to fold its tent and join the party. The struggle for control over the “transition” would shift to trench warfare, with the “donor”-powers digging in through the High Level Committee. That would be business as usual, but now under hyper-factionalized and hyper-mobilized political conditions that were precipiated by the “donor”/powers’ determination to (try to) end the “transition” rather than acknowledge the conditions and simply extend the T.F.I.s without all the fuss.
It is possible that the “transition” fight has put political processes in motion that will go on with their own dynamics, particularly regionalism and localism - the formation of a patchwork of “authorities” contending among themselves (including H.S.M.) in southern and central Somalia. The longer that the T.F.I.s remain in a state of suspended “transition,” devolutionary movements will gain momentum and independent (Somaliland) or autonomous (Puntland) regional states will gain power. Ethiopia will gain by exploiting division.
Is the actual transition – not the “transition” games – already taking place?
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
©2011 All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this article for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Rebublication or redistribution of this report, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Garowe Online
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