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| Last Updated: Jul 21, 2010 - 2:49:12 AM |
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Somalia: Washington’s Response to the Kampala Bombings - Continued Procrastination
21 Jul 21, 2010 - 2:35:24 AM
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By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Analysis of Washington’s statements following the July 11 World Cup bombings in Kampala leads to the conclusion that the United States is determined to persist in its interminable procrastination over what to do about Somalia.
Washington’s inability to form a coherent policy towards Somalia has undermined its interests in the Horn of Africa, allowing a civil war to deepen in Somalia to the point at which Washington’s adversary, the revolutionary Islamist Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.), calculated that it was in its interest to strike directly at Uganda, one of the contributors to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Mogadishu (AMISOM). For Washington, the Kampala bombings were an embarrassment, not the crisis and shock that they were in East Africa. The bombings simply showed more slippage in Somalia; Washington had no intentions of getting decisively involved in Somalia – it faced a public relations problem of how to appear to be playing while remaining on the sidelines conducting its permanent policy review that never seems to end.
The Development of Washington’s Response
Washington’s first response to the bombings came from Under-Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson, who is the point man for Somalia policy. Carson denounced H.S.M., which he likened to a “localized cancer” that had “metastasized into a regional crisis … that has bled across borders and is now infecting the international community.” Let us note that Carson is demonizing H.S.M. here and depersonalizing them by calling them a disease. This is not the language of the diplomat but of the rabble rouser. It was simply politically necessary for Washington to express outrage.
Nonetheless, at the same time that Carson was throwing raw meat to the crowd, State Department spokesman Philip Crowley told reporters that he could not talk about any plans that Washington might have for responding to the bombings, adding that H.S.M. is “an outgrowth of other issues” – refugees, the illegal arms trade and piracy.
The most comprehensive statements on Washington’s Somalia policy came on July 14 in a briefing for reporters on “Al Shabaab Terrorist Group” conducted by “senior officials” and posted in full by Washington. A close reading of the briefing follows.
In the introductory remarks, a senior official (Johnnie Carson?) took a nuanced view of H.S.M., saying that it had a “dual persona;” most members of H.S.M. are nationalist and a minority is transnationalist with ties to Al-Qaeda. So much for the metastasizing cancer metaphor.
In responding to the question of what the United States is doing, a senior official cited having listed an H.S.M. commander as a terrorist and having frozen the assets of an H.S.M. financier under Executive Order 13536. More generally, the official said that Washington would “use the tools available to support international efforts to weaken this group [H.S.M.].” In particular, Washington would continue to support AMISOM with training and supplies, and assist internally displaced persons. How to cope with the spillover of H.S.M. would be “something that we are going to work with very closely with regional governments to counter.” To put it simply, Washington was not going to assume a leadership role.
When asked whether there had been a policy shift in light of the bombings, an official said that Washington would “take a look and see what it is that we need to do as a result of those attacks.” As to whether the bombing showed a “trend” in H.S.M.’s behavior, the official said that “this is something that our government is going to be looking very closely at and working with governments in the region on.” The official’s remarks not only indicate that Washington remains committed to procrastination, but that it had not formulated a contingency plan for responding to a major H.S.M. attack in the region.
Despite warnings by H.S.M. that it would attack AMISOM contributors at home, and despite Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetang’ula’s claim that Nairobi had shared intelligence with Washington on H.S.M.’s plans to strike East Africa, and had asked for Washington’s help, the official said that “there was no forewarning or reports that these attacks were going to be taking place in Kampala.” Perhaps there were no forewarnings of the specific attacks – what fighter tells their opponent about their specific plans? – and no reporting (H.SM. had succeeded in keeping its plans secret). Yet the warnings of attacks were loud and clear; they apparently were not taken seriously and, as a consequence, the bombings caught Washington flatfooted. That the attacks supposedly came out of the blue also shows intelligence failure. The official admitted that H.S.M. was “making good on its threats to carry out attacks.”
As for the goals of U.S. policy in Somalia, an official said that they were to build up the capacities of AMISOM as well as the T.F.G. [Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government], which is exactly what Washington has been doing half heartedly throughout its exercise in procrastination. Any grander aim “is going to take years to address because the problems that affect the country are systemic, structural.” That is an admission that Washington has no policy, that is, no mediation between vision and tactics, no plan of action.
On the ground, an official said, Washington was working with the T.F.G. and AMISOM “to broaden the area of Mogadishu” controlled by the T.F.G. with the essential protection of AMISOM. That is also current U.S. tactics and marks no change.
At its end, the briefing circled back to its beginning, with an official opining that H.S.M.’s power has been overrated – “it’s just operating in a place where normal structures are so very broken.” The official expressed concern about H.S.M. in the sense that Washington would be concerned about any group that had “Al Qaeda elements sprinkled within it.” Is H.S.M. a metastasizing cancer or an ice-cream sundae sprinkled with al-Qaeda chips? The official’s rhetoric diminishes H.S.M.’s stature and threat, which makes it possible for Washington to justify its procrastination.
With Washington’s own dual persona in place, it was time for U.S. President Barack Obama to weigh in. In his interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation on July 15, Obama would somehow have to reconcile the duality, speak from one of the poles, or speak from both; he chose the latter. Beginning with the raw meat, Obama said that Washington would “redouble” its efforts in Somalia, adding that “what we know is that if al-Shabaab takes more and more control within Somalia, that it is going to be exporting violence the way it just did in Somalia” – a declaration of a “trend.” Then he drew back and entered the caveat that fighting H.S.M. was not something that Washington “should do alone;” rather, Washington would cooperate with the African Union through AMISOM on “working the T.F.G. to try to stabilize the situation.” Obama had wedged together Johnnie Carson’s initial statement and the “official” background briefing – much bark and little bite.
The same day, State Department spokesman Crowley emphasized the continuation of support for AMISOM and said that Washington would extend it if Uganda deployed, as its president, Yowaheri Museveni, said that it would, two thousand more troops to the mission. Museveni’s pledge, however, was premised on an expansion of AMISOM’s mandate by the United Nations Security Council from peacekeeping to peace enforcing.
Also on July 15, Washington posted on America.gov an official interview with the State Department’s Counterterrorism Coordinator Daniel Benjamin who continued the Obama administration’s effort to downplay H.S.M. Benjamin said that Washington “would have to consider” if H.S.M. had reached a new level of capability. As for H.S.M.’s links to al-Qaeda, Benjamin urged caution. Although H.S.M. “has some indirect links to the transnational terrorist group al Quaida,” those ties have to be “examined with great care:” some of H.S.M.’s leaders have pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda “has been in touch with al-Shabaab from time to time,” and its operatives have trained some H.S.M. “individuals.” Benjamin concluded, however, that “we certainly do not see these groups as having merged or being unitary in any way.” There is no firm link “just yet.” That would be one more reason for keeping the procrastination going and tempering any response.
On July 19, the development of Washington’s position reached an intelligible conclusion (probably provisional) in a press briefing by a “U.S. official” in London who unveiled a new strategy of trying to “divide the insurgents,” thereby splitting their dual persona. In the Reuters report of the briefing, the official quickly backtracked, admitting that “we know nothing that galvanizes Somalis like an outside influence.” Indeed, if Washington were to do “something in an imprudent manner,” it would unite the insurgents. Rather than being a new strategy, dividing H.S.M is a gesture of impotence. The official added that there was “vigorous discussion” going on among Somalia’s African “allies” about expanding AMISOM’s mandate to peace enforcement, leaving a crack in the door open for a more vigorous response, depending upon what the regional states and organizations come up with. Again, Washington would not take a leadership role.
On July 19, the commander of the U.S. Africa Command (Africom), Gen. William Ward, addressed the Center for Strategic and International Studies, saying that military assistance to AMISOM could include additional equipment, training, logistical support and information-sharing. Ward insisted that the promised boost in support for AMISOM was not a result of the Kampala bombings: “We were already looking at how can we be more robust in helping [AMISOM contributors].” Ward ruled out U.S. employment of drone aircraft to support AMISOM for the present. Reuters reported that a “U.S. counterterrorism official” had not ruled out U.S. military operations against H.S.M. and had added that connections between H.S.M. and al-Qaeda were close: “It’s hard to figure out in some cases where one group ends and the other begins…That’s why it’s critical that we take aggressive action to thwart them.” The official insisted: “Our efforts are aggressive and have intensified.” Did the counterterrorism official’s statements indicate a shift in U.S. policy, a dispute over policy between the State Department and the Defense Department and /or other security agencies, or inflated rhetoric? Did they indicate that Washington was no longer interested in dividing H.S.M.? They are at least an indication of confusion in Washington.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis of Washington’s strategic response to the Kampala bombings indicates that the attacks were not, at least for Washington, a “game shifter,” as Chatham House analyst Sally Healy thought they would be when she spoke to the U.S. military newspaper Stars and Stripes. Richard Downie of the Center for Strategic and International Studies came closer to the truth when he told the same publication: “I don’t really see what the United States can do. There aren’t any attractive options.”
What would make Washington assume leadership or, as analyst Bronwyn Bruton persuasively argues, “constructively disengage?” That is a question for readers to answer.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago
weinstem@purdue.edu
©2010 All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this article for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Rebublication or redistribution of this report, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Garowe Online
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