How Kenya and Somalia can jointly defeat Al-Shabaab militants

MOGADISHU, Somalia - For the last 15 years, both Kenya and Somalia have borne the brunt of Al-Shabaab attacks, losing over 5,000 civilians and security officers besides struggling to build their economy which has been mutilated by the Al-Qaeda-linked group whose operations have disoriented the functioning of respective governments.

Al-Shabaab represents a deeply rooted structural problem in Somalia and to some extent in Kenya. It is an entrenched, mafia-like organization, integrated into almost every facet of society, the economy, and government in the southern parts of Somalia.

Research done by the Global Initiative Network validates claims that the group provides basic services, mostly relating to security and justice, and enjoys a degree of legitimacy in some areas. More importantly, al-Shabaab operates a sophisticated revenue-collection network, even in areas it does not physically control.

The undermining of al-Shabaab’s grassroots legitimacy in the eyes of local populations is the ambition of sweeping state-building and counter-insurgency efforts in Somalia and the neighboring states like Kenya thus the need for a long-term solution to the predicament the Horn of Africa is facing.

Currently, the two countries have invested immensely in military operations which have yielded fruits in the last few months, leading to the liberation of many towns within Somalia. The Kenya Defense Forces [KDF] has been integral in state building in Somalia, deploying over 3,500 soldiers for the peacekeeping mission.

But defeating Al-Shabaab requires not just military operations but also employing ideological tactics which are important in degrading the militants. Largely, Al-Shabaab exists due to its ability to collect colossal amounts of money through illegal taxation across Kenya and Somalia.

For too long, Global Initiative Network contends, Kenyan authorities have turned a blind eye to the smuggling trade, viewing it as an inevitable and relatively harmless economic crime. However, Kenya might do well to begin treating cross-border smuggling as a national-security issue.

Such an approach would not be without precedent: in 2015 a ‘sugar unit’ briefly existed within Kenya’s National Intelligence Service, specifically to combat contraband sugar entering the Dadaab refugee camps.

Furthermore, Kenya already criminalizes illegal entry into Somalia, a country designated by the Kenyan government as a terrorist threat, and similar legislation might be enacted to encompass the illegal cross-border movement of goods benefiting terrorist groups.

Secondly, Kenya might consider phasing out its protectionist tariffs on sugar imports. While sugar is only one commodity among many in the Somalia–Kenya illicit border trade, it accounts for a significant share of that trade.

Reducing or eliminating tariffs would reduce the profit incentive for smuggling sugar into Somalia, and therefore potentially lead to a significant decrease in the volume of the overall cross-border trade taxed
by al-Shabaab.

The report by the Global Initiative Network dubbed "Terror and Taxes Inside Al-Shabaab's revenue-collection machines" further recommends that Kenya might consider re-opening its border with Somalia to official trade. Already, such plans are underway after President Hassan Sheikh's visit to Nairobi where he discussed the same with his counterpart William Ruto.

In addition, Kenya and the Jubaland administration already coordinate closely on border-security policy. It would be feasible for them to jointly establish official checkpoints that are recognized by both sides, and to charge tariffs that compete with the rates charged by al-Shabaab.

In the future, the report opines, vehicles that pass between Somalia and Kenya might be fitted with RFID/GPS toll devices that would streamline the taxation process as well as allow authorities to monitor whether they had passed through al-Shabaab checkpoints during their journeys.

For Somalia, there is a need to explore the possibility of monitoring vehicles that routinely access Mogadishu port. Vehicles that are found to have passed through al-Shabaab checkpoints might be denied permission to export their cargo.

Finally, federal and local authorities in Somalia might consider entering ‘trade talks’ with al-Shabaab, aimed at reducing the overall tax burden throughout southern Somalia. The Jubaland administration and other governmental authorities should offer to reduce their own taxation rates in order to prompt an equivalent response from Al-Shabaab.

Ideally, such an approach would eventually result in ‘free-trade zones’ within some areas of the country. Reaching such an agreement with al-Shabaab would be particularly timely at the current juncture. The group is losing strategic towns and the integration of tactics will eventually liberate the Horn of Africa from the militants.

GAROWE ONLINE