OP-ED: Somalia at the Precipice: Why Decentralized Security is the Only Path Forward

Somalia finds itself at a critical juncture. Despite years of international support and considerable resources poured into its security sector, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has demonstrably failed to protect its citizens from the relentless insurgency of Al-Shabaab. Far from liberating territory, the FGS is losing ground, with critical strategic locations like Moqokori, Adan Yabaal, and Maxaas falling back into the hands of the extremist group. This alarming regression, coupled with the FGS leadership's apparent preoccupation with political maneuvering, has created a vacuum that Al-Shabaab is expertly exploiting, pushing Somalia closer to the brink of a complete collapse, a grim scenario that has prompted warnings even from international observers.

The current trajectory is unsustainable. The FGS’s centralized, top-down approach to security has proven inadequate against an adaptable, locally entrenched enemy like Al-Shabaab. The very aspiration of a strong, unified national army, while noble in theory, has remained largely elusive in practice, plagued by corruption, internal divisions, and a disconnect from the immediate needs and realities of local communities. Instead of a cohesive fighting force, what we often see are under-equipped, demotivated, and frequently overstretched units, unable to hold gains or effectively counter Al-Shabaab's guerrilla tactics.

The FGS's failures extend beyond military setbacks. There is a palpable sense among ordinary Somalis and informed observers that the leadership's primary focus has strayed from national security to the preservation of power. The ongoing discussions surrounding national elections and the persistent rumors of attempts to illegally extend terms fuel public distrust and divert crucial attention and resources away from the existential threat posed by Al-Shabaab. This political paralysis and self-serving agenda at the highest levels of government directly undermine any genuine efforts to build a resilient and effective security apparatus.

The potential for Al-Shabaab to seize Mogadishu, a prospect that has been recently highlighted by reputable international publications, should serve as a stark wake-up call. Such a catastrophic outcome would not only be a devastating blow to Somalia but would also have profound destabilizing effects across the Horn of Africa and beyond, creating a safe haven for international terrorism and exacerbating regional crises. The international community, which has invested so heavily in Somalia's stabilization, cannot afford to ignore these clear and present dangers.

It is time for a radical but pragmatic shift in strategy: a comprehensive decentralization of the security dossier to the Federal Member States (FMS) and local clan militias. This is not a long-term solution to the complex challenge of state-building, but an urgent, temporary measure to confront the immediate threat and prevent further disintegration. The successful experiences of Puntland State and the Hawadle Macawisleey demonstrate the efficacy of such an approach. These localized forces, deeply rooted in their communities, possess invaluable intelligence networks, enjoy greater trust among the populace, and are highly motivated to defend their homes and livelihoods from Al-Shabaab's depredations. They are not fighting for abstract national ideals, but for their very survival.

The concept of leveraging local, clan-based forces to combat extremist groups is not without precedent in other conflict zones. In Iraq, for instance, the "Anbar Awakening" saw Sunni tribal militias, with crucial support from international forces, play a pivotal role in turning the tide against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a precursor to ISIS. These local fighters, intimately familiar with the terrain and the social fabric, effectively marginalized and expelled the insurgents from areas where the centralized Iraqi security forces had struggled. Similarly, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), primarily Shiite militias, emerged as a critical force in combating ISIS, especially when the Iraqi national army faltered. While the long-term implications of such non-state actors in security frameworks are complex and require careful management to prevent future fragmentation or human rights abuses, their immediate effectiveness in specific counter-insurgency contexts cannot be denied. These examples from Iraq highlight that when a centralized state apparatus proves inadequate, empowering local, highly motivated actors can be a vital temporary measure to regain control and create breathing room.

Therefore, the national and international resources currently intended for Somalia's central security institutions must be immediately redirected to the FMS. These regional administrations are best placed to mobilize, equip, and coordinate local clan militias. They have the on-the-ground understanding of clan dynamics and local grievances that the FGS often lacks, enabling them to build trust and foster genuine collaboration in the fight against Al-Shabaab. This redirection of resources should be accompanied by robust oversight mechanisms to ensure accountability and prevent misuse, but the fundamental principle must be to empower those who are demonstrably willing and able to fight.

This measure must be explicitly treated as a temporary arrangement, strictly limited to the current crisis and lasting only until a new, legitimate mandate is installed following credible national elections. During this interim period, a comprehensive and inclusive dialogue must commence involving all Somali stakeholders – the FGS, FMS, civil society, traditional elders, and international partners – to fundamentally rethink and finalize the architecture, mandate, and structure of a future national army. This process must prioritize a bottom-up approach, ensuring that the new national security framework is truly representative, responsive to local needs, and capable of effectively protecting all Somali citizens.

In closing, Somalia stands at a crossroads. The current FGS approach to security has unequivocally failed, leaving the nation vulnerable to an existential threat. To avert a complete takeover by Al-Shabaab, a bold and immediate paradigm shift is required. We urge all stakeholders, particularly Somalia’s international partners, to reconsider their current strategy. It is imperative to acknowledge the FGS’s shortcomings and immediately pivot towards a decentralized security model, empowering Federal Member States and clan militias as the frontline defense against extremism. This temporary measure, backed by redirected national and international resources and rigorous oversight, is not a capitulation but a pragmatic necessity to buy time and create space for a genuine, inclusive, and ultimately effective long-term solution for Somalia’s security. The alternative is a descent into further chaos. The time for action is now.

Abdusalam Salwe

Email: amsalwe@gmail.com

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this article are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect Garowe Online's editorial stance.